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 The long and lucrative history of smuggling in the early modern period receives 
the attention of colonial scholars only as it relates to their isolated geographic field of 
study, ignoring the broader history that linked imperial economies in a mercantilist age. 
This thesis addresses the history of eighteenth-century smuggling in the Caribbean by 
examining both British and Spanish sources in order to shift the angle of focus away from 
imperial metanarratives and towards an understanding of the commercial networks forged 
between Spanish and British colonists on the periphery of empire. By examining the 
contraband trade between Jamaican merchants and residents of Cartagena, this work 
explores the blurred lines of colonial jurisprudence as well as the commercial networks 
necessary to the survival of those colonial spheres.  
 These interimperial commercial relations brought together a diverse group of 
actors who defied the mercantilist ambitions of their respective monarchies. This thesis 
exposes the conflicts and compromises that arose in the colonies in order to facilitate 
economic survival and success. The Spanish residents of Cartagena, due to the erratic 
arrival of the galleon fleet in the eighteenth century, depended on Jamaican merchants for 
their most basic necessities. For their part, Jamaican interlopers used the licit slave trade 
of the asiento contract in order to flood the Spanish port cities with British manufactured 
goods, thereby stimulating the economy of their own island. Despite the many conflicts 
that erupted between the maritime powers of the eighteenth century, the illicit flow of   
 
  
goods through circum-Caribbean ports linked geographically distant parts of the world in 
a global economy that survived and flourished despite imperial mandates ordering its 
cessation.   
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THE CUTLASS IS RAISED 
 
 Tales of dramatic encounters on the high seas abound in the historical literature of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yet, perhaps no meeting between two foreign 
captains elicited quite as resounding a response as that between Master Robert Jenkins 
and Captain Juan de León Fandiño when their ships met in the crystal blue waters of the 
Caribbean Sea on April 9, 1731. One captain would leave the scene to achieve some 
amount of fame in the defense of San Augustine‟s Castilo de San Marcos, while the other 
would arrive home and be presented before Parliament, becoming famous only for his ear 
inciting enough outrage to push even the pacifist Robert Walpole to assent to the need for 
war against Spain. The ensuing conflict, while lost in historical obscurity next to the more 
dramatic conflicts of the later eighteenth century, began a series of wars between Great 
Britain and France, with Spain as both an ally and occasional observer, which would cost 
both crowns their North American empires.
1
 And, yet, when Fandiño brandished his 
cutlass onboard the Rebecca, neither man could foresee the events that one swift move of 
a blade could set in motion.  
 Under orders from the Spanish crown in an anachronistic reversion to coastal 
defense via privateering, Captain Fandiño and his crew sailed that day in search of 
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contraband smugglers operating too close to Spanish-held possessions. The bright Union 
Jack would have flown over the deck of the brig, Rebecca, just off of the coast of Havana 
as Fandiño maneuvered his vessel alongside that of Master Jenkins. The probability of 
the Rebecca sailing under the asiento contract meant that Fandiño started with the 
formalities of asking for Jenkins‟ paperwork. Unfortunately for the British seaman, while 
the ship‟s papers called for a voyage from Jamaica to London, Fandiño found it far too 
off course to be ignored. A further examination of the ship revealed it stocked full of both 
fresh provisions and Spanish gold, ostensibly the result of a smuggling venture recently 
completed in the Spanish port city of Havana.
2
 Fandiño had caught a prize. 
 Despite the obvious illegality of Jenkins‟ presence off the coast of Havana with a 
hold full of products of the island, a dispute erupted between the two men. Perhaps the 
dispute was merely personal, perhaps Jenkins was assured of his own legitimacy despite 
the contents of his hold, or perhaps Fandiño was simply incensed at the British captain‟s 
blatant disregard for mercantile legislation. While it is impossible to discern exactly what 
happened onboard the Rebecca, one part of the fight has survived in the historical record 
– the severing of Jenkins‟ ear. Fandiño cut off Jenkins‟ ear and allegedly told him, “„Take 
this to your king and tell him if he were here I would do the same to him.‟ Then after 
relieving the Rebecca of her gold, and a goodly part of her provisions, Fandiño released 
her.”3  
 The severing of Jenkins‟ ear, while dramatic in a purely anecdotal way, did not 
initially stir the passions of Parliament to war. In fact, Jenkins did not appear before 
Parliament until 1738 to attest to the abuse he suffered at the hands of the Spanish – 
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allegedly accompanied by his ear pickled in a jar.
4
 Seven years after his fateful encounter 
with Captain Fandiño, Jenkins was presented before Parliament merely as an example of 
the many abuses perpetrated by the Spanish against British merchants, prejudicing both 
the safety of British citizens as well as the lucrative trade, licit and otherwise, which 
enriched Britain‟s merchants on either side of the Atlantic. For the Spanish, who 
vehemently denied contributing to Jenkins‟ one-eared state, it was the British who were 
abusing Spanish trade prerogatives. Contraband trade in the Spanish Caribbean and 
Mainland ran rampant, carried in large part by ships bearing British registry papers. If 
Fandiño acted in an overly aggressive manner, it was largely due to the state of siege 
under which the Spanish crown viewed their American possessions. Oddly, a mere 
twenty-five years before Jenkins and his ear testified before Parliament, Spain and Great 
Britain signed a treaty which granted Britain certain trade rights in Spanish America 
under the auspices of the asiento contract. Whether either power recognized then the 
possibility of mutual abuses, the events leading up to and following Jenkins and 








                                                          
4
 Harold V.W. Temperley, “The Causes of the War of Jenkins‟ Ear, 1739,” Transactions of the Royal 







 The vastness of the Americas confounds attempts at synthesis. From Columbus, 
who mistakenly placed the Americas as an appendage to Asia, to modern historical works 
that avoid conceiving of American history as hemispheric, conceptions of the region 
remain fragmented. For historians of the colonial era, the boundaries of modern nation-
states or linguistic regions serve to delineate where one history begins and another falls 
into obscurity. In the past three decades, the Caribbean has become increasingly more 
important in the historiography of the British Empire.
1
 These scholars focus their works 
on connecting the British Caribbean with the wider empire – correcting the traditional 
tendency to only pay attention in the historiography to the thirteen seaboard colonies 
which would become the United States of America. While this upsurge in scholarship on 
the British Caribbean fills a necessary gap in the scholarship, few of them connect the 
British islands with the polyglot circum-Caribbean. Spanish American historians, 
additionally, have moved more and more towards focusing on the Spanish Caribbean.
2
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Yet, as with their counterparts in British Caribbean historiography, few works on the 
Spanish American side traverse imperial boundaries.
3
   
 The eighteenth-century Caribbean exemplifies the gap between colonial 
historiographies of the Americas and the realities of that colonial period. Despite the 
differences between the colonial projects of the British and Spanish empires, the 
Caribbean demonstrates the effect of “intractable local conditions which might well 
impose themselves to the extent of demanding from the colonists responses that differed 
markedly from metropolitan norms.”4 Those responses which posited colonies‟ interests 
in opposition to imperial desires, moreover, oftentimes resulted in individual imperial 
subjects acting in each other‟s own shared interests. Instances of colonists working in 
concert with one another in defiance of metropolitan mandates, however, are generally 
overlooked by historians whose focus rarely exceeds the boundaries of their specific 
empire or region. In the Caribbean, however, that type of oversight becomes increasingly 
difficult as eighteenth-century trade networks wove throughout the territories of the 
British and Spanish empires precisely because of the local conditions which necessitated 
those commercial relationships.  
 By examining contraband trade networks and the local conditions which 
necessitated them, this work explores the common history of Spanish and British 
colonists in the Caribbean. The specific aim, however, is just not to trace the trade 
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networks that linked the port cities of Kingston, Jamaica with Cartagena de Indias in the 
eighteenth century. Instead, the subsequent chapters will explore the ways in which local 
conditions shaped similar circumstances on the ground that resulted in the steady increase 
of contraband trade between the two ports – a trade which defied all imperial mandates 
ordering its cessation. While the subject of contraband trade as a result of British 
possession of the asiento de negroes contract appears often in the historical literature of 
both empires, those works invariably focus on the experience of either the British or the 
Spanish. Axiomatic of most economic history, “The researcher, like the export merchant, 
stands on the dock waving goodbye without examining what happens to his shipment 
afterward, or even wondering why there was a market for it in the first place.”5 This work 
plunges into that divide and explores not just how eighteenth-century contraband trade 
functioned in a specific region but, more importantly, why.  
 The British Empire‟s participation in the transatlantic slave trade necessarily 
draws the Caribbean islands of Jamaica and Barbados into increased historiographic 
light.
6
 The role of the South Sea Company in furnishing slaves for Spanish America, 
specifically, occupies the pages of several important works.
7
 Such narratives, however, 
rarely consider the relationship between the desires of the South Sea Company and the 
interests of the residents of Jamaica whose livelihood depended both on contraband trade 
with Spanish America and ready access to the African slaves for the island‟s sugar 
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plantations. Additionally, traditional works regarding the South Sea Company‟s 
involvement in contraband trade with Spanish America largely describe Spanish  
officials‟ “venality” as the reason for the continuance of the trade without examining the 
particular local conditions in parts of Spanish America which necessitated that trade, nor 
the equally as “venal” actions of South Sea Company employees who profited from 
Caribbean contraband. I seek to place the actions of Jamaican interlopers, South Sea 
Company merchants, and wealthy Jamaican planters in the context of local Caribbean 
conditions which encouraged and supported the transimperial contraband trade. 
 While local Jamaican interests contradicted the interests of the South Sea 
Company, the same could be said about the interests of residents of Cartagena de Indias 
and the Bourbon monarchs. The port city lacked regular access to legal Spanish trade 
goods while enjoying an abundance of gold and gold dust arriving from the interior.
8
 
With Jamaican merchants and interlopers eager for access to gold, contraband trade 
between the two regions developed its own internal logic which defied the reforming and 
centralizing ambitions of the newly crowned Bourbon monarchy. Despite the logic 
behind the contraband trade, even historians of Spanish America tend to discuss the trade 




 While relying on such secondary source material, by considering local conditions 
as the main impetus for the contraband trade, this work will avoid the deeply imbedded 
stereotypes that tend to obscure and overwhelm this complicated history. Contraband 
trade in the eighteenth-century Caribbean illuminates the intertwined history of imperial 
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subjects which is oftentimes neglected in traditional nation-state narratives. Despite the 
prevalence of works which perpetuate stereotypical assumptions, “we inhabit an era in 
which integrative efforts are once again coming to the fore. Continental, Atlantic, and 
hemispheric approaches offer conceptual schemes intended to make sense of the 
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THE ASIENTO CONTRACT IN JAMAICA: IMPERIAL  
DESIRES AND COLONIAL REALITIES 
 
 From the Treaty of Tordesillas, promulgated in 1492, until the mid-seventeenth 
century, the Spanish crown maintained a relatively successful stranglehold on 
transatlantic shipping. The discovery and conquest of the gold- and silver-rich Aztec and 
Inca empires brought immense wealth to the Spanish throne along with the acute 
attention of its European rivals. As such, the first incursions of northern European nations 
into the Americas revolved around the search for precious metals to mine or Spanish 
ships to plunder.
1
 Despite the disparate long-term outcomes of European colonial projects 
in the Americas, the Spanish experience was the one most sought after initially by 
Britain, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands – who all continued to encroach upon 
American territory despite Spain‟s claim of legitimate sovereignty.  
 The British experience, rather than mirroring that of the Spanish, became one of 
tenuous settlement in challenging terrain. The fact that neither the French nor the Dutch 
fared much better in discovering vast deposits of mineral wealth in the Americas 
indicated rather clearly that the Spanish experience was exceptional. Without access to 
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wealthy mines or sedentary indigenous labor on the scale of Mesoamerica or Peru, 
Spain‟s rivals initially turned instead to gaining access to Spanish wealth through trade 
and plunder. Once established in relatively unimportant outposts in the Caribbean and the 
American mainland, Britain, France, and the Netherlands focused much of their naval 
ambition on high-seas depredations against the Spanish treasure fleets.
2
  
 While the relatively weak economic and military position of Elizabethan England 
necessitated dependence on the naval success of privateers, the England of Oliver 
Cromwell approached the Atlantic World with far more aggression. With relative peace 
in Europe and an underlying religious desire to place Protestantism in a more prominent 
position, Cromwell turned his sights on the Spanish Caribbean in an aggressive policy 
aptly called the Western Design. In 1655, Cromwell planned an all-out attack on a 
Spanish territory in the West Indies in the tradition of Elizabethan raids conducted by 
privateers such as Francis Drake. While Cromwell expected his planned raid to continue 
in the Elizabethan legacy of war „beyond the line,‟ the reality of his overtly aggressive 
policy necessitated a break in amicable relations in the eyes of the Spanish – setting the 
stage for eighteenth-century conflicts where belligerence in the Americas translated to 
widespread warfare on the European mainland.
3
 Although Cromwell dispatched Admiral 
Robert Venables without clear orders of which Spanish possession to attack, when the 
fleet landed at Barbados the admiral and his advisors quickly settled on Hispaniola as the 
site for English aggression in the Spanish Caribbean. 
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 While Venables gathered supplies and a hodge-podge assembly of men in 
Barbados, the grand design was betrayed by the Spanish Ambassador in London who 
warned his counterparts in Iberia that plans for an English invasion were underway. 
Ambassador Don Alonso de Cárdenas even named Hispaniola as a possible site of the 
imminent attack, leading to the intensification of fortifications on the island.
4
 The stepped 
up defenses around Santo Domingo along with the inability of Admiral Venables and his 
counterpart in the invasion, Admiral Penn, to conduct the siege cooperatively, 
disembarking too far away from the town, lack of food, rain, trekking from the coast 
without a guide, and suffering ambushes along the way, led to three brutal and fruitless 
weeks of fighting.
5
 Even though Venables and Penn were unable to grasp their target, the 
survivors of the expedition turned their ambitions towards the relatively unimportant 
island of Jamaica – with drastic consequences for the history of the Caribbean and British 
prowess in the Atlantic World. 
 The defensive position in which the Spanish crown found itself during the 
seventeenth century, both in the Caribbean and on the continent, drastically affected its 
ability to provide defenses and supplies to backwater locations such as Jamaica. In order 
to provide protection for the treasure fleets, upon which Spain‟s war efforts throughout 
Europe depended, the Spanish crown focused its naval forces strictly on defense of the 
carrera de indias and the ports which provided harbor to those treasure-laden ships – 
rather than providing defense for peripheral territories such as Jamaica. Dutch privateer 
Piet Heyn‟s spectacular success in the early decades of the seventeenth century cemented 
Spain‟s commitment to protecting the treasure fleet at the expense of the rest of its 
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American empire. In 1628, don Juan de Benavides commanded a fleet of fifteen ships, 
only four of which were capable of warfare, on their way from New Spain to Havana and 
then ending in Seville. Other than the four galleons, the other eleven ships were merchant 
ships laden with silver, gold, pearls, and other treasures being shipped from the Indies. 
While approaching Havana, Benavides encountered a fleet of thirty-two Dutch ships 
blocking the harbor. In avoidance of a Dutch attack, he attempted to slip into Matanzas 
Bay. Unfortunately, “Benavides‟ pilots were apparently less familiar with this bay‟s 
shoals than they claimed, and several of the large ships foundered, stranding the treasure 
well offshore and leaving most of the ships‟ guns pointing the wrong way. Heyn and his 
men seized the opportunity and captured all fifteen vessels, taking half for prizes and 
setting fire to the rest.”6 Benavides was summarily executed upon his return to Spain due 
to his apparent negligence that resulted in the loss of approximately 12 million florins of 
imperial and private treasure. Although no privateer ever claimed as large a prize as 
Heyn, the disastrous loss of the annual treasure fleet focused Spanish naval attention 
specifically on the carrera de indias – inadvertently contributing to the loss of the island 
of Jamaica. 
 The Jamaica of the Spanish empire served as little more than a backwater to the 
more important colonies in New Spain and Peru. The island suffered both from a lack of 
supplies as much from an utter lack of proper military installations and protection from 
the crown. Even the ragged survivors of Cromwell‟s Western Design proved capable of 
taking Santiago de la Vega and spreading out across the island. Despite two separate 
waves of reinforcements from Mexico, Jamaica remained in the hands of the British. 
Following a brief conflict in which England and France engaged in an alliance against 
                                                          
6




Spain, the Spanish crown eventually recognized English claims to Jamaica and signed a 
peace treaty in 1667 in Madrid. The peace treaty, while ceding Jamaica permanently to 
the British, reflected Spanish desires to oblige their British counterparts to rein in 
privateering in the Caribbean.
7
 With official recognition of their territorial claims in the 
Greater Antilles, Cromwell issued immediate orders to the governor of Jamaica to halt 
the English privateers defending the island‟s coast. The subsequent disregard of those 
orders by Governor Thomas Modyford would set the stage for the conflict between 
privateers and merchantmen which came to characterize Jamaican politics in the 
eighteenth century.  
 As Britain gained territories in the Americas, British merchants engaged in a more 
vigorous transatlantic trade with a growing attention to tapping under-supplied Spanish 
markets. The indiscriminate attacks of loosely sanctioned pirates and privateers which 
characterized the Elizabethan sea-wars now worked against the interests of the British 
crown, whose merchants complained vociferously about the pirate-infested waters of the 
Caribbean.
8
 In response, the British navy initiated a policy of hunting down the pirates 
who had been sanctioned by the state in generations prior. The eighteenth century became 
the era of contraband trade in the Americas as British merchants endeavored more 
completely to break through Spanish mercantilist control. Nowhere were the tensions 
between royal order and local reality more acutely felt than the fledgling island of 
Jamaica, whose security, politics, and economic welfare largely depended on privateers 
and smugglers. 
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 The nature of the Caribbean contraband trade that developed shortly after 
Britain‟s acquisition of Jamaica requires defining: yet, by the same token, it defies 
definition. To some extent, this work will use the words smuggling, contraband, illicit 
trade, and interlopers to denote the same phenomenon – the introduction of merchandise 
to Spanish America in defiance of Spanish mercantilist legislation which prohibited the 
entry of foreign goods. Contraband in this sense can be defined as “inter-imperial or 
supranational trade (sometimes called „direct trade‟) that was illicit from the vantage 
point of at least one of the colonial powers involved.”9 From the Spanish perspective, 
such a definition appears rather straightforward. Complications, however, arise from the 
British understanding of the trade – especially in accommodating the disparate economic 
desires of the metropolis and Jamaica. For the islanders, whose economic survival 
depended on interloping in the early years before the explosion of sugar production, the 
tensions between imperial trade and their own smuggling operations served as a constant 
source of contention. Negotiations for the asiento de negros, or the legal right to supply 
Spanish America with African slave labor, further compromised Jamaica‟s economic 
niche and brought its illicit operations under the increasing scrutiny of the metropolis. 
Exploring the role of Jamaica in this web of pseudo-legal interimperial trade while 
demonstrating the constant conflict present between British merchants and Jamaican 
interlopers will be the focus of the rest of this chapter. 
 The use of privateers that characterized British policy regarding Spain in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries turned abruptly as the possibility of attaining the 
coveted asiento contract became a reality in the eighteenth century. Clearing Caribbean 
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Sea lanes of British naval predators became a fundamental part of Britain‟s foreign policy 
in the hopes that such actions would make its bid for the asiento contract more appealing 
to Spain. While even Spain had recognized Britain‟s right to maintain its hold on Jamaica 
with the stipulation that its sailors end their high seas depredations, the nature of security 
in the Caribbean made the enforcement of such a policy a more complicated endeavor for 
officials in London. 
 For decades prior to this fundamental shift in policy, British territories in the 
Americas depended on privateering vessels for naval defense in the absence of an 
abundance of official vessels of the British Navy.
10
 In fact, the practice of impressment 
meant that the Navy‟s presence oftentimes prejudiced the security of the areas it was 
attempting to protect. During King William‟s War, in the final decades of the seventeenth 
century, the increased presence of the British Navy in the waters around Jamaica aroused 
the ire of the Council of Jamaica. According to the Council‟s minutes from July 21, 1696, 
“Moreover all our privateers and seamen (who were a great good and strength to the 
Island) have left us, and most of this has happened by the harassing and ill-using of the 
men-of-war, who have frightened away not only our own people but also those of the 
Northern Colonies from bringing us provisions.”11 The British Navy‟s dependency on 
impressment in order to man its war effort quite literally scared away Jamaica‟s primary 
line of defense – the pirates and privateers who called Kingston home. In fact, the 
demands of the British Navy during King William‟s War, coupled with the disastrous 
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loss of life after a major earthquake in 1696, threatened the very survival of Jamaica. The 
conclusion of the war the following year gave the island an opportunity to collect itself 
and its resources, but wartime correspondence made it clear that Jamaicans preferred 
their veritable fleet of privateers to the protection offered by the official British Navy. 
 As the British navy attempted to rid Caribbean waters of Jamaica‟s pirates, it 
offended not simply the island‟s attempt to attain security but a part of its economic 
lifeblood as well. As a fledgling outpost of the British Empire, Jamaican residents 
utilized their island‟s strategic position in the Caribbean by converting Kingston into a 
hub of contraband trade with the Spanish Main – basically carving out for themselves a 
position as middleman in a lucrative and illegal supply chain. As described by Jamaican 
resident Richard Harley in a letter to the Board of Trade in the months prior to the final 
signing of the asiento contract, “The Trade with the Spaniards from Jamaica (tho‟ 
Collusive) has been very considerable: and „tis for certain for seven Years past (about 
which time is commenced de Novo) the Spaniards have been supplied from thence, one 
Year with another, with three or four thousand Negroes, in return for which, and for 
Flower, Woollen and other Goods, there has been received from them in Gold and Silver 
and the Produce of New Spain, 200,000 l. or 250,000 l. Yearly.”12 While more research 
needs to be done on the far-flung trade networks that supplied the flour and woolen goods 
which Harley cites, Jamaica‟s role as a transit point for illicit trade with Spanish America 
appears both profitable and well-established in the decades before Britain attained the 
asiento contract. 
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 The lucrative trade already being conducted through the island of Jamaica was 
foremost on the minds of British officials as they vied to gain control over the asiento 
contract. Within the first decades of the eighteenth century, a European conflict provided 
Britain the opportunity to snatch the contract away from France, thereby increasing their 
access to Spanish American ports in a diplomatically safer way than through widespread 
smuggling. The death of Charles II of Spain without an heir embroiled Europe in a 
decade long conflict. In 1712, however, the conflict ended with the installation of a 
Bourbon monarch on the Spanish throne and appeasements granted to all of the powers 
involved. For its part in the Grand Alliance, Britain was granted the asiento contract for a 




 During the negotiations for the asiento contract, which was intended to run for 
thirty years starting in 1713, one of the foremost challenges for the new Spanish 
monarch, Phillip V, revolved around whether or not to allow the British to engage in 
additional trade while delivering a specified number of slaves annually to Spanish 
American ports. The knowledge that neither the Dutch nor the French after them turned a 
profit during their possession of the asiento spurred the British negotiator, Manuel 
Manassas Gilligan, to push for expanded trading privileges. The contract that Phillip V 
eventually signed included a hard-won provision for limited trade. The additional article 
reads: 
Besides the foregoing articles stipulated on behalf of the English 
company, his Catholick Majesty, considering the losses which former 
assientists have sustained, and upon this express condition, that the said 
company shall not carry on, not attempt any unlawful trade directly or 
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indirectly, under any pretence whatsoever; and to manifest to her 
Britannick Majesty, how much he desires to pleasure her, and to 
conform more and more to a strict and good correspondence, has been 
pleased, by his royal decree of the 12
th
 of March in this present year, to 
allow to the company of this asiento, a ship of five hundred tons yearly, 





Although Phillip V granted the British assientists a five hundred ton trade ship, the article 
proceeds to stipulate that trade was only permitted in correspondence with the annual 
Spanish trade fairs, indicating an attempt by Phillip V to soften the economic blow of 
British trade on Spain‟s own commerce with its colonies. Despite this stipulation, British 
merchants trading under the guise of the asiento contract rarely timed their trading 
endeavors to coincide with the annual fleets sent from Sevilla. And, yet, the economic 
consequences of the British asiento trade to Spanish America may not have been nearly 
as detrimental as the contraband trade upon which many Spanish American ports 
depended for survival. While British assientists provided some competition for Iberian 
manufactures, the interlopers operating out of places like Jamaica proved much more 
successful in saturating Spanish American markets with affordable trade goods. 
 For the British, the inclusion of the article required deft political maneuvering – 
an indication that the slave trade was neither inherently profitable nor even the foremost 
reason why Britain sought to acquire the asiento. In fact, the key British negotiator, 
Manuel Manassas Gilligan, engaged in widespread smuggling in the Caribbean in his 
early years. Arguably then, the inclusion of the clause reflected Gilligan‟s knowledge of 
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the possible profit to be made from smuggling in Spanish America.
15
 While the asiento 
contract provided for a certain amount of legal trade to be conducted with Spanish 
America in goods other than slaves, obtaining that contract proved extremely unpopular 
amongst most Jamaicans – despite the prominent role the island would eventually play in 
the trade. 
 In the years before Britain acquired Jamaica, the island‟s role as a conduit for 
illicit trade was relatively well-established. The Spanish residents, largely ignored by the 
trade ships sent from Sevilla, produced hides from the island‟s feral cattle population and 
wood cut from its forests – goods which they were unable to get to legal markets. Despite 
the prevalence of salable merchandise on the island, “While they waited for a ship, hides 
rotted, and wood was consumed by termites. On the other hand, the ships that did arrive 
carried in their holds products of higher value than those of the island. Therefore, the 
islanders were unable to buy goods and no one dared dispatch a ship to Jamaica for the 
purposes of trade. Hence was born the „silent-trade‟ with the pirates, taking their place on 
the margins of royal regulations.”16 While the island‟s sovereignty changed in the 
seventeenth century, its economic role remained largely the same – now augmented by 
the collusion of the Royal African Company in supplying slaves to Jamaica both for the 
islanders themselves and for their illicit redistribution to Spanish American ports.  
 The Royal African Company served as Britain‟s royally sanctioned slave trading 
company during the seventeenth century.
17
 While the company continued to exist into the 
                                                          
15
 Lance Grahn, The Political Economy of Smuggling: Regional Economies of Early Bourbon New 
Granada (Westview Press, 1997): 122. 
16
 Francisco Morales Padrón, Spanish Jamaica (Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston & Miami, 2003): 159. 
17
 For a summary of the Royal African Company, see: Charles Hayes, Malachy Postlethwayt, and 
Kenneth Morgan‟s The British Transatlantic Slave Trade. Vol. 2, The Royal African Company (London: 




mid-1740s, its economic demise was largely guaranteed by the formation of the South 
Sea Company whose charter gave it the sole right to conduct the asiento trade – veritably 
sounding the death knell of a company which had lost its monopoly in 1698.
18
 The Royal 
African Company also continually faced challenges from independent traders who gained 
access to portions of the African coast and transported slaves to the Americas. With the 
declining importance of the Royal African Company in the transatlantic African slave 
trade in the eighteenth century, Jamaican interlopers and planters found themselves 
forced to deal with the South Sea Company – whose business interests were focused 
more on tapping the Spanish market than providing for the livelihood of Jamaicans. In 
addition, the royal sanction given to the South Sea Company essentially excluded 
Jamaican interlopers from their historic economic position in the Caribbean. On 
September 7, 1713, the South Sea Company received monopoly over the Spanish 
American slave trade by mandate of the British crown. That monopoly privilege 
essentially excluded active participation from either the Royal African Company or 
Jamaican interlopers.
19
 From the beginning of the operations of the South Sea Company, 
then, the stage was set for conflict between the royally sanctioned company and the 
Jamaicans whose livelihood depended on their illicit trade with the Spanish Main. 
 The island of Jamaica, positioned in the center of the Spanish Caribbean, was a 
natural choice as a refreshment station for the South Sea Company‟s transatlantic slaving 
vessels. Initially, both Barbados and Jamaica were used as refreshment stations but, by 
the mid-1720s, Jamaica eclipsed Barbados in importance due to the resources of the 
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island and the volume of trade carried on there.
20
 The abundance of cattle and produce in 
the early decades of the eighteenth century, before the island was completely dedicated to 
the production of sugar, meant that factories on the island were well stocked.
21
 The 
refreshment stations in Kingston allowed South Sea Company agents to recuperate their 
slaves after the notoriously insalubrious Middle Passage in an attempt to make them 
appear healthy before being shipped to their final destinations for sale. According to 
Palmer, “The agents made special efforts to feed the slaves well at this time. Twice a day 
they were fed meals that included beef, rice, flour, yams, biscuits, bread, fish, bananas, 
and a Barbadian food called canky.”22 The increased commerce in providing victuals to 
the refreshment stations, however, did little to offset the loss in valuable contraband. 
 Conflict between the metropolis and Jamaica largely defined the relationship 
between the two entities from the early decades of British control of the island. Residents 
of Jamaica maintained a mutually beneficial relationship with the pirates and privateers 
who provided income and protection for the island – a relationship which directly pitted 
colonial concerns against imperial desires. As Britain engaged in the slave trade to 
Spanish America, the tensions between the metropolis and Jamaica heightened, 
eventually leading to a flurry of correspondence across the Atlantic that argued against 
the operations of the South Sea Company and the asiento contract. According to a letter 
from the Council of Trade and Plantations to the King of England, “the Gentlemen of 
Jamaica, who have attended us on behalf of the Island, do say, that the Assiento being 
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solely in the South Sea Company, exclusive of all interlopers, is a great detriment to 
Jamaica, where formerly the inhabitants had a considerable trade in negroes by 
connivance to the Spanish Coast.”23 While merchants and interlopers in Jamaica engaged 
the Council of Trade on their behalf, the political pull of the South Sea Company in 
Parliament meant that the island‟s appeals largely fell on deaf ears. The assiduous efforts 
of British politicians to obtain the asiento contract and the financial interests engaged in 
the formation of the South Sea Company effectively meant that Jamaican complaints had 
little effect across the Atlantic. 
 Despite the complaints of Jamaican planters and interlopers regarding the 
operations of the South Sea Company, the island‟s issues were largely overshadowed by 
more pressing imperial concerns. For the British Empire, trade with Spanish America 
brought in invaluable specie which was necessary for their trade with India – the 
maintenance of which the British crown deemed more important than the complaints of a 
few planters and seamen. In order to maintain its trade with India, Britain annually 
exported £400,000. Without a domestic supply of silver, the majority of the specie 
employed in the India trade came from foreign sources like Spanish America.
24
 
Additionally, certain trading posts along the African coast demanded cloth imported from 
India in exchange for slaves – thereby requiring Britain to maintain a steady supply in 
order to furnish slaves for the transatlantic trade, upon which Jamaican planters 
depended.
25
 From an imperial perspective, despite the intense ire aroused in Jamaica by 
the asiento contract, it could be argued that Britain‟s very ability to supply slaves to the 
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 While the asiento contract injured the economic well-being of Jamaican 
interlopers, another financial interest on the island felt sufficiently threatened by the 
South Sea Company to join in the chorus of complaints leveled at Parliament. The 
island‟s sugar planters overwhelmingly felt that the asiento contract with Spanish 
America prejudiced their ability to acquire labor sufficient for their burgeoning 
plantations. The governing class of Jamaica was largely composed of wealthy planters, 
Sir Nicholas Lawes being no exception. In accordance with his position on the island, 
Governor Lawes complained vociferously against the practice of the South Sea Company 
to ship the healthiest slaves to Spanish America. According to Lawes in a letter to the 
Council of Trade and Plantations of November 11, 1717, “The Assiento carrys all the 
able, stout and young negros, or such as they call peic‟d Indias to the Spaniards and sell 
none to the Planters but the old sickly and decrepid, or what are call‟d Refuse; if a choice 
negro is sold to a Planter, he might give as much or more than that of the Spaniard and 
that in ready mony.”27 The dearth of specie throughout the British Empire especially 
injured the ability of Jamaicans to compete with Spanish buyers, who were rarely forced 
to rely on credit to purchase their slaves in the same way that their Jamaican counterparts 
did. For the financial success of the South Sea Company, then, it is hardly surprising that 
it preferred Spanish markets. 
                                                          
26
 A good summary of the effect of Spanish American silver during the Early Modern period can be 
found in Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein‟s, Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of 
Early Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).  
27




 The main conflict between the South Sea Company and Jamaican elites came in 
the form of legislation especially prejudicial to the company. During the tenure of 
Governor Lawes, from 1718 until 1722, the island‟s council began to vigorously enforce 
a head tax on all slaves unloaded on the island, even if their arrival was simply for 
refreshment and not sale. Governor Lawes offered an elegant defense of the island‟s right 
to extract such a tax from the South Sea Company. Lawes explained that the tax had 
always been a part of Jamaican legislation even during the days of the Royal African 
Company – what had changed, of course, was enforcement. Regardless, Lawes argued, 
“But this duty of 20s. per head was laid by the Assembly many years before the South 
Sea Company had the Assiento, and is paid by all H.M. subjects. It may be concluded 
that the Company orders their ships to Jamaica as being the most convenient port. They 
can well afford to pay that easie duty, which is not half so much as their factors gain by 
them. But if they cannot afford to pay the duty out of the profits of the Assiento, then it 
may be supposed the negroes imployed on our Plantations are of greater advantage to this 
Kingdome, than selling them to the Spaniard.”28 Governor Lawes‟ letter indicates a 
firmly entrenched belief in Jamaica that the South Sea Company was enriching itself at 
the expense of Jamaica‟s economic survival. 
 For its part, the South Sea Company claimed that its involvement in Jamaica – 
using the island as a refreshment and distribution point – contributed positively to the 
island‟s economy. As explained by the Council of Trade and Plantations to the King of 
England, “the Company do frequently hire sloops in the Island for transporting their 
slaves after they are refresh‟d to the Spanish Continent, and their own ships being oblig‟d 
either to return home empty or accept of a moderate freight, the inhabitants of Jamaica do 
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thence obtain an opportunity of sending home the product of their Island on much 
cheaper terms than formerly.”29 The absurdity of the South Sea Company arguing that it 
contributed positively to the economy of Jamaica by providing cheaper shipping back to 
the metropolis, even though without slave labor Jamaican planters had very little produce 
to ship, was not lost on the coalition of planters and interlopers. Even the argument that 
the South Sea Company hired Jamaican sloops to carry slaves to the Spanish Main must 
be understood with the qualifier „frequently,‟ meaning that many times the South Sea 
Company maintained the slave trade using its own vessels – thereby completely cutting 
Jamaican interlopers out of their former trade. 
 Although Governor Lawes‟ prolific pen brought the troubles of Jamaica to the 
attention of the British Parliament, the political prestige of the South Sea Company 
frequently beat out the island‟s interest. Defenders of the South Sea Company were also 
able to play on much more deeply entrenched fears than their Jamaican counterparts. In a 
letter from Daniel Wescomb, an employee of the South Sea Company, to William 
Popple, the Secretary of the Lords of Trade, Wescomb argues that, “the Company 
conceive it to be contrary to the practice of all Nations, where goods are imported duty 
free to burthen „em upon their re-exportation, and they can‟t but deem this duty to be an 
infringement upon the Assiento contract, in which H.M. and the King of Spain are 
parties; that after a contract has been entered into for 30 years, that Trade shou‟d be 
burthen‟d with new duties, and may occasion a misunderstanding with the King of Spain 
and be of ill consequence.”30 The tenor of Wescomb‟s letter seems constructed to touch 
on an ever-present fear for the British throughout the era of the asiento contract, namely 
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that a conflict between Spain and Britain would cause a disruption in their profitable 
trade relations. Such fears appear more reasonable when considered in terms of the global 
trade which would be prejudiced by a cessation of the Spanish American trade. By 
playing on British fears of a misunderstanding between the two thrones, Wescomb‟s 





 This brief political conflict reflected the immense unpopularity of the asiento 
contract amongst Jamaicans – who did not abandon their lucrative trade with Spanish 
America but, rather, took it further underground. 
 Following the tradition of the island, the principal means available to Jamaicans 
to counter the economic monopoly of the South Sea Company was the contraband trade. 
As planters complained about the low-quality slaves being sold to them while those of the 
highest quality were being shipped to Spanish America, interlopers turned this to their 
advantage. In a telling letter from the South Sea Company to James Pym, the president of 
the Cartagena factory, on December 12
th
, 1723, company officials argued, “the Great if 
not the only Cause of that Factorys not being So well Supplyd as they might have 
otherwise been, and has been a very Great Encouragement to the private Traders, who 
find no Difficulty of Furnishing themselves at Jamaica out of what we leave, and at more 
Easy Rates.”32 Jamaican interlopers cut into the South Sea Company‟s monopoly by 
clandestinely trading the lower quality slaves which the Company left in Jamaica to the 
Spanish Main for much lower prices than those stipulated by the asiento contract. 
Interestingly, as will be seen in the final chapter, independent Jamaican interlopers 
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primarily functioned as competition for agents of the South Sea Company who also 
engaged in widespread smuggling of both slaves and merchandise.  
 While Jamaican planters railed against the quality of slaves being shipped to 
Spanish America at their expense, the South Sea Company struggled to meet the specific 
demands of the asiento contract. The contract allowed the South Sea Company legal 
hegemony over the slave trade to Spanish America for thirty years, with a yearly total of 
4,800 piezas de Indias – a standard measurement of slaves delivered which accounted for 
the age, condition, and gender of the slaves. It was critical to the South Sea Company‟s 
profitability that they deliver all of the piezas allowed to them each year. As the contract 
worked out, “a duty of 33 1/3 pesos would be paid the Spanish crown on each of the first 
4,000 piezas; the remaining 800 would be admitted duty free. In the event that the 
company delivered more than 4,800 piezas in a year, it would pay a duty of 16 2/3 pesos 
on each excess pieza.”33 Therefore, despite the vociferous complaints of Jamaicans, the 
South Sea Company‟s financial success depended on delivering all 4,000 piezas allowed 
each year in order to sell the last 800 without being subject to paying a duty – naturally 
placing primacy on supplying the Spanish American market before that of Jamaica. 
 While the South Sea Company energetically engaged in the asiento contract in the 
hope of amassing wealth through access to Spanish American ports, its dreams of wealth 
proved evanescent.
34
 As Palmer effectively argues, in addition to political instability 
throughout the period of the asiento contract, “The South Sea Company was also the 
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victim of the profound changes in the organization of the slave trade that had begun to 
occur in the eighteenth century. The chartered company was fast becoming a commercial 
anachronism; the age of the energetic private trader was at hand.”35 Therefore, Palmer 
argues for an interesting interpretation of the political battles waged between Jamaican 
interests and the South Sea Company in the early years of the asiento contract – namely 
that while Jamaican planters and interlopers portrayed themselves as largely victimized 
by the imperial trade system, it would be the South Sea Company that proved unable to 
compete in the transatlantic slave trade. In the long run, the Kingston interlopers would 
far eclipse the South Sea Company in supplying the Spanish Main with much-needed 
trade goods. For its part, the South Sea Company struggled within the confines of the 
legal system to provide trade goods to Spanish America while its Jamaican counterparts 
engaged freely in trade – thereby dramatically increasing their profits. Although agents 
for the South Sea Company did, in fact, engage in contraband trading to Spanish 
American ports, the burden of judgment when traders were caught by Spanish officials 
fell squarely on the shoulders of the Company, even when it may not have been its agents 
conducting the contraband trade but, rather, their interloping Jamaican competitors. The 
reason for the steep demand and availability of contraband markets in Spanish America 
will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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THE ASIENTO CONTRACT IN CARTAGENA: 
IMPERIAL DESIRES AND COLONIAL  
REALITIES 
 
 Following the currents directly south from Jamaica, British contraband traders 
found themselves on the coast of New Granada. The fortuitous location of the island of 
Jamaica created a smugglers‟ paradise in the warm Caribbean waters between Kingston 
and the Spanish Main. In the 1730s, two young Spanish naval officers traveled 
extensively throughout Spanish America as escorts for a French scientific expedition. The 
officers, Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa, recorded the observations they 
made on the voyage for the King and his ministers as well as for the consumption of the 
Spanish reading public. According to their testimony about the Spanish Main, “In more 
than 1500 leagues running from Caracas, Santa Marta, and Cartagena on the north coast 
to Lima, there are no armed forces except for those on the coast assigned to the defense 
of the farthest reaches of this extensive territory.”1 The vast expanse of the New Granada 
coastline coupled with a complicated geography of inlets, coves, and long stretches of 
unpopulated beaches made policing the coasts logistically and economically unfeasible.
2
 
How New Granada, with Cartagena de Indias as the focal point, became entrenched in 
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such widespread illegal commerce and what the Bourbon monarchy attempted to do to 
stop it will be the focus of this chapter.  
 The Spanish expansion from the Caribbean into mainland settlements in South 
America mirrored the search for gold which defined their plundering of Hispaniola and 
Cuba. Expeditions sent out with the goal of finding gold or silver were not particular to 
Spaniards in the colonial period, but their fortuitous encounter with the treasure-rich 
Aztec empire encouraged expeditions into unknown portions of the Spanish Main – 
setting up settlements along the way. One of the first, Cartagena de Indias, was 
established in 1533 by Pedro de Heredia as an outpost for the plundering of Indian 
communities along the Sinú River. After a few initial years of plundering Indian tombs 
for gold, “Spanish looting gave way to a more systematic exploitation of the land and its 
peoples. During the 1540s, stock raising was established in the vicinity of Cartagena, and 
surviving Indians were gathered in encomiendas to provide the tribute required to sustain 
the invaders‟ settlements.”3 As looting was slowly replaced with placer mining, the 
colonial economy of Cartagena grew in importance along the Spanish Main – as did the 
demand for African slave labor to exploit the streambeds of the New Granadan interior.
4
 
 The gold rush in New Granada lasted long enough to establish the region as a 
sphere independent from Peruvian and Venezuelan influence but not long enough to 
establish it as an outpost worthy of the kinds of attention received by its wealthier 
counterparts in Peru and New Spain. By the mid-1620s, the gold rush in New Granada 
was over and not until the eighteenth century would the region resume production of gold 
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in any considerable quantity. And yet, “New Granada had become a distinctive region in 
the empire, outside the orbit of the great, silver-based espacio peruano to the south, and 
with its own commercial connections to Spain.”5 New Granada‟s evanescent gold rush in 
the sixteenth century proved to have a two-fold effect on the development of the city of 
Cartagena de Indias: it became a major port for the flotas of the carrera de indias on their 
way to Portobelo at the same time that it developed a flourishing contraband trade with 
its European neighbors in the Caribbean. The unreliability of the Spanish fleet system 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries left Cartagena with a fundamental 
lack of trade goods coupled with an excess of specie in the form of gold and gold dust.   
   Throughout the colonial period, Spain‟s entire American empire suffered from a 
constant lack of trade goods and supplies from the metropolis. Although some of the 
blame for such a dearth of goods lay in the overwhelming demands of the treasure fleet, 
the Spanish shipping industry seemed utterly incapable of providing even the most basic 
goods to places other than New Spain and Peru. By 1720, in fact, Phillip V issued a royal 
cédula regarding when the Spanish fleets should sail in order to re-establish trade 
between Spanish America and the Iberian Peninsula.
6
 The King‟s emphasis throughout 
his royal order regarding the re-establishment of trade in order to stimulate Spanish 
manufacturers indicates just how little trade flowed between the two regions by the 
eighteenth century – the consequences of which would play out in the colonies between 
non-Iberian suppliers and Spanish colonists despite the ambitions of European monarchs. 
  For the fledgling settlements of New Granada, issues in establishing and 
maintaining royal governance reflected the physical topography of the territory as much 
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as Spanish American-wide issues with the sale of positions and dearth of legal trade 
goods. Along the Spanish Main, “settlements were widely dispersed and each tended to 
become a distinctive cell, whose inhabitants sought to mark off their own territory from 
competitors in order to monopolize its resources. This tendency toward the creation of 
autonomous local units was, moreover, accentuated by the difficulties of communication 
over long distances and rugged terrain.”7 Interestingly, the evolution of an intense notion 
of local autonomy would eventually manifest itself in a sense of economic autonomy 
from Madrid – much to the ire of metropolitan officials. In the twilight years of the 
Hapsburgs on the Spanish throne, the city of Cartagena maintained its economic 
livelihood through participation in illegal interimperial trade throughout the Caribbean. 
Threats to the sovereignty of the city, including a successful attack by the French, 
brought the port to the attention of the metropolitan officials in the seventeenth century, 
yet reform would wait until the ascension of the Bourbons in the eighteenth. 
 An autonomous spirit in the city of Cartagena reflected the general sense of 
settlements throughout the Spanish Main, but it also evolved from the interesting legal 
position of the port in relation to the jurisdiction of the Audencia de Santa Fe – the 
precursor for the Viceroyalty of New Granada. On paper, from its founding in 1550, 
Bogotá served as the capital of civil and legal administration for the audencia – under 
whose jurisdiction Cartagena fell. Yet, the immense territory of New Granada was 
divided even further into local gobiernos, alcaldías mayores, and corregimientos which 
were, “divided by the jurisdictions of fiscal, military, civil, and ecclesiastical government, 
each designed to uphold a specific area of authority. In practice, however, such divisions 
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fractured rather than facilitated royal control over the territory because they splintered 
central authority, thereby compounding the problems of communication and command 
imposed by distance.”8 While jurisdictional authority posed a problem throughout New 
Granada, the defensive position of Cartagena in the Caribbean convoluted issues of 
jurisdiction for the city. As gobierno y comandancia general, each governor of Cartagena 
was directly appointed by the King with special authority which left him largely outside 
the purview of the Audencia de Santa Fe.
9
 
 The expense of maintaining security for the carrera de indias as well as the added 
expense of conducting almost continual warfare in Europe weakened Spain‟s financial 
stability – further detracting from its ability to provide for its American colonies. Perhaps 
the most telling example of the kinds of financial troubles encountered by Spain can be 
seen in the manner in which it staffed its colonial bureaucracy. By the seventeenth 
century, many of the positions of authority in Spanish American governance were being 
sold to the highest bidder in order to raise revenue for the crown.
10
 The practice of 
vending royal positions reflected offices being considered akin to land which could be 
bought, sold, or leased. The sale of offices, however, netted the Spanish monarch no 
wealth and “In this there was no profit for the Crown, and small thanks. What wonder 
that a prudent and impecunious king should seek to do on his own account what his loyal 
subjects, with royal connivance, had been doing for years.”11 Accordingly, Phillip II 
engaged in the widespread sale of nonsalaried offices in Spanish America, raising much 
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needed revenue while simultaneously staffing colonial positions with individuals who 
considered their offices an investment – one on which they intended to both recoup their 
losses and perhaps gain a profit. 
 Intuitive of the possibility of corruption inherent in selling positions in royal 
administration, the crown decided to prohibit the sale of offices in which a salary was 
paid from royal coffers. Ostensibly, if officials were receiving a salary from the treasury, 
then they may be induced to embezzle money in order to repay the debts they accrued 
through purchasing the office.
12
 The issue of falling into debt in order to purchase a 
position in colonial governance, however, led bureaucrats to engage in various business 
ventures in Spanish America even with the exclusion of salaried offices. Throughout 
Spanish America and across the colonial period, “The officials who purchased their posts 
tried to make as much money as possible during their tenure. A royal officeholder sent to 
the colonies from Spain „often had only a fixed number of years in the New World to pay 
off his debts and accumulate enough capital to live as expected upon his return.‟”13 
Officials who purchased their office expected that their position in colonial governance 
would result in a certain standard of living upon their return to Iberia. There existed a 
basic understanding that the purchase of the position was an investment with the 
expectation of a return – a return which purchasers would attain through licit or illicit 
means. 
 Those colonial officials who purchased office in Spanish America generally 
turned to whatever local commerce was prevalent in their region in order to earn a profit, 
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for example, the cochineal trade in Mexico or silver mining in Peru.
14
 As powerful and 
educated men of the upper ranks of society, colonial officials generally experienced 
success in their economic ventures with those in Cartagena being no exception. For the 
governors of Cartagena and the viceroys of New Granada, however, the most profitable 
enterprise was the contraband trade with Jamaica. As a port city which lacked legal trade 
goods but held abundant specie, Cartagena left colonial officials little choice but to 
engage in the contraband trade that flourished throughout the Caribbean. By contrast, for 
Jamaican governors, sugar plantations provided them with abundant wealth equivalent to 
their station in life – an economic livelihood which largely put them at odds with the 
asiento contract and, by extension, the illicit trade to the Spanish Main. For that reason, 
and due to the source material used in this study, the Cartagena side of the contraband 
trade must necessarily be seen through the eyes of the royal officials who profited from 
such commerce. The prominence of royal officials in the following narrative, therefore, 
reflects both their prominence in the trade as well as a source base which provides little 
insight into other groups such as merchants or, even, who else may have been involved in 
the contraband trade. 
 The situation in Cartagena came to the full attention of royal authorities when, in 
1685, a visita general was dispatched to the region in order to examine reports of local 
government‟s abuse of Indians as well as widespread evasion of taxes and duties. Under 
orders to investigate the functioning of local governance throughout New Granada, 
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Carlos Alcedo y Sotomayor left for Cartagena. Upon his arrival in the city, however, the 
Visitador-general was barred from entering with the governor of Cartagena claiming that 
Alcedo had no jurisdiction within the city. “The governor then arrested Alcedo and, after 
failing to suborn him with a large bribe, deported him aboard a small, leaky boat bound 
for Havana.”15 While Alcedo returned to Madrid without fully accomplishing his 
intended mission, he was apparently able to ascertain that local governmental officials in 
Cartagena were engaged in gross misconduct – with perhaps the most biting indictment 
including a claim that “the crown was being defrauded of the enormous sum of 20,386 
castellanos each year,” through evasion of payment of the quinto, or a tax of a royal fifth 
on the minting of gold, with the apparent collusion of local officials.
16
 While the most 
incriminating aspect of Alcedo‟s report seemed to be the evasion of payment of the 
quinto, he also stressed the presence in Cartagena of foreign vessels conducting illegal 
trade in broad daylight throughout the port. 
 While Alcedo‟s report suggests at least the tacit approval of royal of officials in 
Cartagena in the contraband trade, for Spanish governors or viceroys in almost all 
Spanish American port cities during this period, illicit trade frequently constituted their 
only means to obtain basic necessities for the region under their jurisdiction. In their 
survey of Spanish America, Juan and Ulloa witnessed firsthand the widespread 
contraband trading in the port of Cartagena. According to their report, however, the 
contraband trade “happens only when the galleons or registry ships are late. If they were 
not delayed, there would be no shortage of supplies or excess of specie in the interior, 
which is the reason merchants throughout America engage in this vicious illicit 








commerce.”17 While Juan and Ulloa‟s report came nearly a full century after the ill-fated 
visita general of Alcedo, the problem of supply contributing to the prevalence of 
contraband trade remained the same – which is not to say that the Bourbons failed to 
attempt to remedy the situation. 
 The tacit approval of the contraband trade on the part of governors and port 
officials in Cartagena reflected the lack of legal trade goods which entered the port. 
Arguably, by allowing foreign merchants to introduce basic foodstuffs, even if that also 
meant gaining a small profit from those transactions, governors were serving the greater 
good of the populace. In the century between the 1670s and the survey voyage of Juan 
and Ulloa, only ten galleon fleets passed through the port of Cartagena – six between 
1675 and 1700
18
 and four between 1713 until 1763.
19
 Many of the intended voyages were 
prevented from embarking from Seville due to the almost continuous state of war on the 
continent and in the sea lanes of the Caribbean. Still others were waylaid in Spanish 
American ports, unable to sell their merchandise due to the prevalence of contraband 
goods in the markets. Throughout the colonial period, galleon fleets consistently 
encountered Spanish American markets flooded with goods from foreign contrabandists. 
Considering the content of most of the contraband vessels – flour and slaves – and the 
necessity of those items for the continued economic survival of New Granada, it is hardly 
surprising that the contraband trade flourished.
20
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  Contraband traders inundated local markets with goods at prices far lower than 
those which the merchants of the galleons and register ships could offer. The port of 
Cartagena attracted “buyers from as far away as Quito, smugglers offered necessities and 
luxuries on the northern coast at cheaper prices than licit goods. In fact, a study by highly 
placed Spanish officials estimated that foreign traders undersold legitimate peninsular 
merchants by 40 percent and still obtained a greater profit.”21 The legitimate merchants 
referred to above traded strictly through Seville and, later, Cádiz and were subject to 
various taxes while non-Iberian suppliers were free from such onerous charges – along 
with generally being closer to the supplier, considering Seville‟s role as a trans-shipment 
point rather than point of origin for most goods being carried across the Atlantic.
22
 
Additionally, with approximately 1,800,000 pesos of silver from Potosí moving through 
Cartagena every year, the prevalence of foreign merchants willing to smuggle goods into 
Cartagena was nearly constant.
23
  
 Following Alcedo‟s expulsion from Cartagena and his subsequent report, the 
newly crowned Bourbon monarch sought to re-exert imperial influence on the Spanish 
Main. The cornerstones of the Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth century revolved 
around more efficient revenue collection, an issue that Alcedo‟s report made clear was 
not occurring in Cartagena, and centralizing authority throughout the empire. With 
Phillip V firmly enthroned in Spain and Europe enjoying a brief respite from conflict 
after the War of Spanish Succession, the new monarch turned his reforming ambitions to 
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New Granada. Taking quite seriously the experience of Alcedo with local authorities as 
well as the strategic position of the port of Cartagena for security in the Caribbean, 
Phillip V and his ministers decided on a reform policy that would centralize authority in 
the region. As a result, “Aiming to improve and invigorate Spanish rule in northern South 
America, they created a viceroyalty around the Audencia of Santa Fe in 1719” and chose 
to make Bogotá the seat of authority for the fledgling audencia – under whose authority 
Cartagena would again fall, while simultaneously maintaining the autonomy it enjoyed 
previously due both to distance and military necessity.
24
   
 Ostensibly, placing more centralized royal authority along the Spanish Main 
would bring the levels of the contraband trade on the coast down and allow for the 
resurgence of legal commerce between Spain and its colonies. In an effort to prepare 
local governance for their new viceroyalty, Phillip V sent an energetic reformer and 
former Minister of the Council of the Indies, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero. 
Eager to accomplish his mandate, Pedrosa immediately launched into an investigation of 
local governance. At the beginning of his two years in New Granada, Pedrosa, “reported 
that the volume of illegal trade in the city was so great that Cartagena had a serious 
shortage of legal currency. As a result, unminted bullion and counterfeit money served as 
the principal forms of exchange.”25 While Pedrosa was able to collect back taxes from 
throughout the region which provided some capital for the new viceroyalty, he left the 
issue of curbing the contraband trade for the incoming viceroy, don Jorge de Villalonga, 
Conde de la Cueva. 
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 The Bourbons intended the creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada to 
provide royal authority which would help increase revenue collection and curb the 
contraband trade.
26
 The role of Viceroy Villalonga, then, revolved around clearing the 
port of Cartagena of foreign merchants so that the markets would not be satiated upon the 
arrival of the galleon fleets. The new viceroy‟s voyage from Peru to his new viceregal 
seat, however, highlights the contradictions both between Bourbon expectations and a 
royal official whose career began in a Hapsburgian system as well as the inherent logic of 
the contraband trade which defied imperial mandates at every level. While traveling to 
his post with his family and entourage, Villalonga occupied ten full canoes – a high 
number for the transportation of only twelve people. During the investigation of his 
tenure following his dismissal, it became clear that the canoes were largely full of articles 
of clothing which he sold for a profit in the city of Mompós on his way to the coast. 
According to the official sentencia del consejo, in fact, Villalonga made close to 20,000 
pesos in Mompós through the sale of his trade goods.
27
 Villalonga‟s entrance into 
Cartagena positioned him for participation in local commerce which, despite the desires 
of the Bourbons, meant illicit commerce. 
 The charges leveled against Villalonga at the end of his term include active 
involvement in the contraband trade and may reveal a fundamental disconnect between 
the expectations of a viceroy in colonial Spanish America and the contradictory 
expectations of the Bourbons. Villalonga‟s lucrative voyage from Peru to his viceregal 
seat falls in line with the behavior of viceroys throughout the colonial period. The arrival 
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of any new viceroy in Spanish America meant that he was, “accompanied by a large 
entourage of family members and servants, all anxious for rich pickings in the New 
World during his tenure of office. His arrival on American soil, and his passage through 
his territory to the capital city, was as carefully staged a ritual event as if the king himself 
were taking possession of his realm.”28 Furthermore, travelling with items for sale in the 
colonial marketplace in order to acquire sufficient capital to set up a viceregal household 
in the New World was common practice during the era of the Hapsburgs. While more 
research remains to be done on the differing expectations of the Bourbon monarchs and 
their viceregal counterparts in the early decades of the eighteenth century, Villalonga‟s 
behavior was considered acceptable in generations prior. Ostensibly, Villalonga 
epitomized colonial corruption in the eyes of the Bourbon monarch who sent him 
specifically to deal with the contraband commerce which ran rampant in New Granada 
when he engaged in that commerce. However, for Villalonga, himself of noble birth, the 
title of viceroy came with certain institutionalized behavior, in which he engaged and for 
which he was eventually punished. 
 Despite Bourbon expectations, the contraband trade arguably flourished under 
Villalonga‟s administration. In a report from José Patiño, the Minister of Marine and the 
Indies, by 1721, the viceregal experiment in New Granada was near collapse. Patiño‟s 
letter details Villalonga‟s involvement in smuggling contraband clothing from the coast, 
allowing his family members to enrich themselves through the contraband trade, and 
incorporating local officials into his profitable smuggling ring. Perhaps the most irksome 
indictment of Patiño‟s letter, however, revolved around Villalonga‟s apparent disregard 
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for preventing foreign ships from entering the harbor at Cartagena. In fact, according to 
Patiño, “there has not arrived a Vessel, nor any type of ship be it English, Dutch, or 
French, that has not been permitted in said Port or, in the coast unloading all of their 
cargo, as there is evidence of having happened in Cartagena when foreign Vessels were 
allowed to unload their cargo eight days before the arrival of the Galleons.”29 From the 
perspective of Phillip V, the final indictment was the most upsetting because it directly 
prejudiced the efficacy of his reforms in New Granada and the security of the port. In an 
arguably theatrical twist to Phillip V‟s restructuring efforts, the very Viceroy placed in a 
position to eliminate the contraband trade and ready Spanish markets for the trade fleets 
actually amassed wealth through increasing the allowance for foreign contrabandists into 
Cartagena. What Patiño‟s letter neglects to mention, however, was the lack of Spanish 
trade ships in the port of Cartagena. While in the eyes of Patiño, Villalonga defied 
imperial ambitions by allowing the entrance of foreign merchant vessels, for the people 
of Cartagena and its environs, those ships carried their only access to basic necessities. 
 Despite Patiño‟s incriminating letter to the king, the viceroyalty of New Granada 
remained under Villalonga‟s tenure for an additional two years – during which time the 
Viceroy and his retinue used every means at their disposal to enrich themselves. 
Villaonga largely did not personally engage in commerce at the port and, therefore, 
depended on others for the maintenance of his commercial networks. In positions where 
he needed to be assured of loyalty, he also appointed members of his own family – 
which, in and of itself, reflected common practice among high-ranking officials in 
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 Following the termination of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, 
however, the governor of the Audencia of Santa Fe conducted an investigation of 
Villalonga‟s term in office – a veritable laundry list of offenses, among which the 
inclusion of members of his family in colonial governance was listed. According to the 
charges leveled against Villalonga, the Viceroy named his nephew to the position of Juez 
de Comisos, a position which ostensibly allowed him to smuggle in contraband clothing 
from the coast without the necessity of bribing another official.
31
 The appointment of his 
nephew to a profitable position, however, did not deviate from normal practice in Spanish 
America and the creation of commercial ties through kinship allowed Villalonga to 
conduct business that depended on loyalty through the port – a practice mirrored in 
concurrent British merchant firms.  
 The appointment of family members to positions in colonial governance fell well 
in line with appropriate behavior for viceroys in Spanish America. The entourage that 
accompanied new viceroys to the Americas veritably depended on those appointments to 
make a profit during their stay in the New World. In fact, viceroys were granted 
“considerable powers of patronage and appointment” during their tenure and were able to 
bring large numbers of family members with them due to this privilege.
32
 In the case of 
Villalonga, he may have received condemnation for his appointment for several reasons, 
each plausible yet difficult to prove. Primarily, Villalonga may have been censured for 
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the position to which he appointed his nephew – perhaps because the nature of the 
position meant that the Viceroy would have free reign to engage in contraband trade 
without risking judicial recriminations. The charges could have been trumped up by a 
jealous governor who conducted the investigation in order to prevent the recreation of a 
viceroyalty and overbearing imperial influence in his region. Perhaps the most plausible 
explanation, however, is that Villalonga‟s behavior may have been deemed acceptable in 
the era of the Hapsburgs but flew in the face of the reforming ambitions of the Bourbon 
monarchs, who saw the nature of his appointment as inappropriate considering the 
problems of contraband trade along the Spanish Main. 
 The tenure of Villalonga epitomized the internal logic of the contraband trade in 
Cartagena which prevented Phillip V‟s energetic reforms from achieving any level of 
success. Even the most basic role of the city as a defensive post for the Spanish Navy in 
the Caribbean was sacrificed for the necessity of conducting trade with foreign 
merchants. According to the residencia cited above, Villalonga was accused of putting 
the port at risk by using the naval vessels stationed at Cartagena to protect the illicit trade 
rather than in defense of the port. Interestingly, members of the Spanish Navy in Phillip 
V‟s ministry argued ceaselessly for the importance of employing the Navy in defense of 
legal commerce, especially in the Caribbean – an opinion which Villalonga staunchly 
opposed during his tenure in New Granada. Arguably, for Villalonga, the increased 
presence of the Spanish Navy in Caribbean waters would temper the flood of foreign 
vessels and, thereby, prejudice the economic survival of New Granada. Interestingly, 
Jamaican officials also railed against the presence and pressures of the Royal Navy and 




viceroyalty were the Bourbons able to make guardacostas, or coastguard vessels, the 
primary mode of deterrence in the contraband trade.
33
 In fact, the aggressive maneuvering 
of coast guard vessels along the Spanish Main following the disbandment of the first 
Viceroyalty led directly to the outbreak of the War of Jenkins‟ Ear. 
 The disbanding of the first viceregal experiment in New Granada came about due 
to the continuance of the contraband trade under Villalonga‟s tenure, despite continued 
requests from the Council of the Indies to end that trade. After ostensibly refusing to curb 
smuggling in the port –  although what Villalonga could have done about it without 
increased Spanish commerce remains unclear – “in May, 1722, the Council ordered his 
dismissal, arrest, and imprisonment and the confiscation of all his property, money, and 
correspondence.”34 Despite the reforming efforts of the Bourbons, the internal logic of 
the Caribbean contraband trade continued during the viceregal experiment and after its 
cessation. The Viceroyalty of New Granada, however, would be recreated during the 
imperial crisis of the War of Jenkins‟ Ear in 1739, during which Cartagena served as a 
particularly valuable and vulnerable port. During the second viceroyalty, the contraband 
trade continued unabated, yet, the viceroyalty survived, partially due to the second 
viceroyalty‟s overriding importance for defense rather than as a method for controlling 
internal issues of governance.
35
   
 The concessions granted to Spain‟s rivals following the War of Spanish 
Succession influenced the emphasis the Bourbons placed on reforming trade in Spanish 
America – especially Britain‟s attainment of the coveted asiento contract. While the 
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asiento naturally allowed for non-Iberian powers to gain some access to Spanish 
American trade, the British asiento specifically allowed for a 500 ton trade ship to 
conduct business in Spanish American ports – much to the reluctance of the Bourbons. 
Accordingly, part of the same reform movement which created a viceroyalty in New 
Granada also pushed for a regularization of the galleons carrying trade goods across the 
Atlantic. For the Bourbon monarchs, “Tighter administrative discipline and more 
effective government were not only required to improve the fiscal yield of colonial 
treasuries; they were also needed to restart Spain‟s transatlantic trade and to rebuff the 
commercial aggression of its European rivals.”36 For Spain, economic rivalry in the era of 
the British asiento included officially sanctioned rivalry – thereby creating urgency for 
the Bourbons to revamp Spanish trade to its colonial port cities.  
 While Britain attained permission to send a 500 ton trade ship to Spanish 
American ports, the stipulation that it could only conduct business at the annual trade 
fairs alongside the Spanish flotas was meant to protect the primacy of Spanish 
merchandise – the trick for the Bourbons, of course, would be to guarantee that Spanish 
ships arrived in Spanish American ports in step with the British register ship. 
Accordingly, in 1720, Phillip V issued the Proyecto de Flotas y Galeones which clearly 
delineated the rules for the sailing of Spanish trade ships along with mandating their 
annual arrival in the Americas. The royal order indicates the dismal condition of Iberian-
American trade, but also the reasons why the Bourbon monarch felt that trade had fallen 
so precipitously. For example, the Proyecto stipulated the seasons in which trade vessels 
could sail from the various ports along with an order for warships to be included in the 
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 Such orders clearly reveal Phillip V‟s knowledge that the loss of ships through 
storms or plunder by non-Iberian rivals and the inability of fleets to sail due to endemic 
warfare in Europe had prejudiced Spain‟s American trade to the point of abandonment. 
The preoccupation with the fleet system also indicates a desire to maintain economic 
hegemony in the Americas in the face of European challengers. In the early decades of 
the eighteenth century, Phillip V‟s reform efforts accomplished very little to curb the 
illegal smuggling voyages of non-Iberian powers into Spanish America, even as the 
regularity of the fleet system improved for a short period. The increased pressure to curb 
the ventures of foreign contrabandists in the markets of New Granada coupled with 
several notable outrages committed by British merchants in Spanish America eventually 
pushed the two crowns to war.  
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BRIBERY, HERESY, AND MURDER:  
TENSIONS ESCALATE 
 
 As the British and Spanish crowns respectively pressured Jamaican interlopers 
and royal officials in Cartagena to eliminate the rampant smuggling occurring across the 
Caribbean Sea, the British asiento contract opened up new methods for conducting that 
contraband trade. Carrying trade goods into Spanish American ports under the guise of 
the asiento contract became an effective means of avoiding imperial sanctions – even as 
the continued contraband trade pushed Britain and Spain closer to the War of Jenkins‟ 
Ear and the end of the asiento period. Considering the importance of the contraband trade 
for the Caribbean economy, however, it is little wonder that it became an unstoppable 
juggernaut which eventually pushed the region into war. The contraband trade, 
“Although illegal, it demonstrated the institution of „freedom of trade in a non-
mercantilist way,‟ that is, an American identity vis-a-vis an imperial expectation. 
Contraband was, quite simply, a central feature of early eighteenth century consumerism 
in all three Caribbean provinces.”1 Although the centrality of the contraband trade is 
indisputable for the eighteenth-century Caribbean, this chapter will analyze not simply 
how the trade operated and who was involved, but also the dramatic events and tensions 
which would lead to war.    
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 The logistics of setting up a transatlantic slave trade which supplied factories 
across the Americas required the South Sea Company to expand into a proto-international 
corporation with a veritable army of employees responsible for the maintenance of the 
Company‟s business. While the Royal African Company eked out a minor subsistence 
along the African coast and in the British Isles, its counterpart developed factories across 
the Atlantic World, fanning out along the African coast, throughout the British 
Caribbean, and into most major Spanish American ports. In order to supply the Spanish 
American market, the South Sea Company operated factories in Cartagena, Buenos Aires, 
Vera Cruz, Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Porto Bello, Panama, and, eventually, Caracas. 
Despite the high demand for slaves and guaranteed price set by the asiento contract, “the 
staffing of these factories was not cheap” and the South Sea Company rarely turned a 
profit during the years under which it operated.
2
 Where profits were made, however, was 
for the individual factors stationed throughout the Atlantic World, due in part to their 
high salaries but also to their involvement in the contraband economy in Spanish 
America.  
 The factories themselves often served as a means for the introduction of 
contraband goods into Spanish American markets. For the appalling logistics of trading 
in human beings, the factories in Spanish America required the constant importation of 
foodstuffs. This need was especially heightened because, “A serious attempt was 
generally made to feed them well in order to build up their resistance to disease and make 
them more salable. Their diet was similar to that in the islands and on shipboard: beef, 
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fish, rice, bread, flour, and bananas.”3 While some of those items could be purchased in 
Spanish America, for factories like the one in Cartagena, the cost of flour and rice from 
Spanish providers was generally prohibitive – resulting in their supply arriving from 
British North America via Jamaica.  
 The shortage of European comestibles in New Granada opened an enormous 
market for contraband flour – a need met throughout the eighteenth century by foreign 
suppliers. While the environs of New Granada provided abundant sources of foodstuffs, 
wheat was not an especially productive crop in the tropical lowland regions where large 
urban populations resided. Additionally, places in the interior where wheat could be 
successfully cultivated were often located in challenging terrain. This resulted in the 
inability of domestic wheat farmers to furnish major port cities such as Cartagena with 
flour.
4
 The factories‟ legitimate and legal need for wheat brought contraband flour into 
Spanish American port cities, where South Sea Company agents could profit from their 
surplus.  
 In fact, the demand for flour in Spanish American port cities linked them to 
Jamaica, and through the Jamaican connection to the mainland colonies, British North 
America. Market farmers in places like Pennsylvania, New York, and Carolina provided 
Jamaican slave merchants with comestibles for their domestic populations with enough 
left over to engage in a vigorous trade with the Spanish Main. According to Jamaican 
Governor Lawes:  
We have a frequent intercourse of trade with the Plantations on 
the Continent of North America, vizt. from New York, they bring 
us flower, staves, pitch and starr etc., from Virginia the product of 
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that country, Pensilvania flower etc., Carolina rice, pork, flower 
etc., New England and Philadelphia lumber of all sorts; in return 
whereof to all the above-named places we send them most, partly 
rum and sugar and mony, and the commodities we have from 
foreign Plantations is chiefly gold and silver, cochineal, logwood 
and other dying woods, mules, coacoa etc., which is in return to 
negroes and all other European commodities, but more 




Such a hemispheric trade defied the principles of mercantilism but was essential for the 
commercial success of the various regions of the Americas – especially providing a 
lucrative outlet for North America‟s foodstuffs. 
 The involvement of South Sea Company agents in the contraband flour trade 
came to the attention of Spanish colonial officials in a variety of ways. For some 
officials, the mere bulk of the flour shipments arriving at the factories was enough to 
warrant further examination. One such shipment, from a British vessel named the Union, 
aroused the suspicion of port officials. The Union arrived in Cartagena in 1735 with 
forty-four barrels of flour – apparently a high enough number to lead Governor Antonio 
de Salas to write a strongly worded letter to the King, condemning the participation of 
South Sea Company agents in the contraband trade.
6
 In a twist which highlights the 
dilemma in which Spanish officials found themselves, the South Sea Company agents 
petitioned Salas‟s administration to allow the sale of the flour because it was in danger of 
spoiling – a petition to which Salas acquiesced. The dearth of flour in Cartagena meant 
that Salas could not risk simply letting the flour spoil, despite the illicit nature of its 
introduction. Ostensibly, the Union brought the flour to the South Sea Company factors 
in Cartagena for sale in the contraband market and, yet, when caught with the barrels, 
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those same factors were able to earn a profit – freed from recriminations because of the 
legal demands of the factory and lack of flour in the city. 
 While the shipment of flour received from the Union may have exceeded a 
reasonable amount for any factory, the importation of comestibles to replenish South Sea 
Company factories was in itself legal. The demand for wheat, therefore, provided a cover 
for British merchants to smuggle more profitable items into Spanish American markets 
via the South Sea Company‟s factories. While the city of Cartagena suffered from a 
dearth of wheat flour, the elites of the city also faced shortages of the latest fashions. 
Products such as Brittany linen came into high demand in eighteenth century Cartagena 
and served as a profitable item for smugglers with legal trade connections to Britain. 
While illicit textiles sold for 25 to 30 percent less than those which arrived through legal 
channels, Jamaican interlopers still risked seizure in order to sell their wares for specie.
7
 
One such Jamaican, Samuel Collet, sailed to Havana in 1722 under contract to supply the 
South Sea Company factory there with wheat. Upon arrival, however, Spanish officials 
inspected his cargo and discovered, buried in the flour, bolts of fabric, wool, and silk 
thread. Collet claimed to have no prior knowledge of the illicit articles and blamed their 
presence on a mariner named Thomas English who had been responsible for loading the 
vessel.
8
 Without the conclusion of Collet‟s trial, what became of the unfortunate 
Jamaican remains obscure but, clearly, the returns for smuggling were high enough to 
warrant the risk. 
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    Whether or not the South Sea Company factory in Havana was complicit in 
Samuel Collet‟s ill-fated smuggling attempt due to his status as an independent captain 
on contract or not, cases of employees of the company involving themselves in the 
contraband trade are hardly scarce. Agents of the Company engaged in all manner of 
trade in Spanish America, seeking out profit through licit and illicit means. Interestingly, 
historian Colin Palmer argues that, “There can be no doubt that the Royal African 
Company began to carry on contraband trade with the Spaniards shortly after it was 
chartered in 1672. The South Sea Company, however, was not tempted to engage in the 
illegal trade, probably because it never had slaves left over after its annual contractual 
obligations were filled.”9 Palmer argues that the South Sea Company did not smuggle 
slaves into Spanish America while their counterpart, the Royal African Company, did in 
the years before the South Sea Company attained the asiento contract. While it may be 
true that the South Sea Company faced continual challenges meeting their contractual 
obligations, agents of the Company did in fact engage in widespread contraband trading – 
at times even of slaves, which Palmer seems to argue were in prohibitively short supply.  
 As discussed previously, Jamaican merchants reacted to the hegemony of the 
South Sea Company by engaging in their own contraband slave trade – using the “refuse” 
slaves left in Jamaica by the Company. South Sea Company employees, however, also 
smuggled slaves into Spanish America by bribing local officials, such as the port master 
or, even, the viceroy, into allowing a certain number of slaves into the port without 
reporting them and, therefore, not taxing their entry. According to the observations of 
Juan and Ulloa:  
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The same method involved in trading smuggled goods is used for 
Negro slaves. When the asiento ships reach Portobelo, a small 
number of Negroes come in legally and are sold in the official 
slave market, but a considerably larger number enter illegally. As 
for smuggled goods, one must always pay a bribe of so much per 
head, just as one pays so much per fardo.
10
 If this is done, one 
never has any difficulty bringing in whatever he wishes. In fact, it 




Although Juan and Ulloa discuss Portobelo above, the implications that the South Sea 
Company did in fact engage in contraband trading, even in slaves, appears obvious. 
Additionally, if contraband slave trading occurred in Portobelo, it may be assumed that 
the same behavior would be prevalent in the port of Cartagena.  
 The extreme shortage of slaves in Spanish America guaranteed contraband slave 
traders a handsome profit, even after paying the necessary bribes. The South Sea 
Company itself had a stake in smuggling slaves during this period, due in large part to the 
stipulations of their contract. As mentioned earlier, the Company paid a tax on all slaves 
introduced to Spanish America up to 4,000 piezas, after which they were allowed to bring 
in another 800 piezas duty free. While Palmer argues effectively that the Company never 
met their contractual obligations, his argument that this meant they did not engage in the 
contraband slave trade ignores that the introduction of any number below 4,000 meant the 
payment of a duty – therefore, if the Company never came close to meeting its 
obligations, smuggling slaves in and avoiding the duty made more financial sense than 
legally introducing 3,999 piezas. For their part, the investment strategies of many Spanish 
officials who purchased their posts in Spanish America encouraged the accumulation of 
wealth, even through accepting bribes from British merchants. 
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 While employees of the South Sea Company engaged in contraband slave trading, 
the archival record also abounds with examples of their involvement in the smuggling of 
trade goods to Spanish American ports – far above that legally stipulated by the asiento 
contract. For example, on April 9
th
, 1723, the packetboat Asiento was detained in Havana 
and the captain and pilot of the vessel taken in for questioning by Spanish officials on the 
island. Captain Alexander Gordon faced accusations of delivering a number of legal and 
registered slaves to Havana, leaving the harbor, but returning to a more private location in 
order to smuggle more slaves into the South Sea Company‟s factory without reporting 
them. Additionally, the packetboat was found to contain a large quantity of contraband 
clothing – Gordon claimed to be ignorant of the clothing and, instead, blamed the pilot, 
Samuel Hearn, whom he claimed was responsible for loading the vessel. Both men were 
found guilty and the clothing and slaves were confiscated and the men were released. 
Despite the verdict, however, by the 7
th
 of February, 1724, both Captain Gordon and the 
packetboat Asiento were back to ferrying slaves across the Caribbean Sea – delivering 
136 piezas de Indias to Cartagena and returning on the 20
th
 of that same month with 144 
piezas. Even Gordon‟s scapegoat, the pilot Samuel Hearn, reappeared as a captain of his 
own vessel in 1730, delivering 146 ¾ piezas, also to Cartagena.
12
 The return of men 
involved in smuggling so soon after their indictment seemingly indicates, at the very 
least, a tacit approval with contraband trading on the part of the South Sea Company – if 
not outright support for the activities of Gordon and Hearn as well as the inability of 
officials in Havana to punish the men with more than just the confiscation of their goods. 
 South Sea Company merchants and Jamaican interlopers did not rely solely on the 
efficacy of bribery as a means of introducing illicit goods. For many non-Iberian vessels, 
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feigning distress gained them access to Spanish American ports, from whence they 
clandestinely delivered their cargo before port officials could inspect the ship‟s hold. An 
eighteenth-century priest by the name of Don Antonio Julián traveled extensively 
throughout New Granada and recorded his observations as a call to arms to the Spanish 
King against the illegal actions of British merchants in Spanish American ports. 
According to Juli n, “the other manner of introducing illicitly, is entering with total 
liberty to the same ports with a title of needing protection from a storm, to collect fresh 
water, to get provisions; and overall when the anchor is secure in port, by various and 
subtle methods, they go and introduce produce around the City.”13 While feigning 
distress was periodically utilized by merchants under the employ of the South Sea 
Company, it was a preferred method for independent smugglers. British ships not 
engaged in the asiento contract only received entrance into Spanish American ports in 
cases of dire emergency under the assumption that Spanish vessels could expect 
reciprocal treatment in British American ports. Contraband traders, however, used this to 
their advantage in smuggling illicit slaves and trade goods past Spanish coast guard 
vessels. 
 While contraband traders were active throughout Spanish America, and Jamaicans 
particularly active in Caribbean ports such as Havana and Cartagena, the latter‟s 
propensity for relatively open trade with foreigners attracted a plethora of non-Iberian 
merchants. In a letter to the King, royal official Juan Pablo de Ibarra expressed his 
intense dismay at the situation on the ground in Cartagena and its environs. Ibarra writes, 
“they are unloading just the same their types of clothing and Aguardiente at whatever 
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time of the day or night, and go through with them to the streets of this city,” where, he 
argues, contraband traders basically engaged in open commerce with total impunity.
14
 As 
Ibarra, writing in the years following the fall of the first Viceroyalty, demonstrates, the 
internal necessity of the contraband trade in Cartagena was such that smugglers operated 
openly, day or night, and engaged in widespread commerce throughout the city. Mostly, 
this reflects the utter lack of licit trade options in the eighteenth-century Spanish 
Caribbean, but certainly, it also reflects the tacit approval which smugglers expected from 
local officials – an approval which largely, before and after the fall of the first 
Viceroyalty, they got. As will be seen, however, the environs around Cartagena made 
policing the contraband trade exceedingly difficult, especially in the region to the 
northeast of the city, an area completely controlled by the independent Guajiro Indians – 
whose involvement in the contraband trade made them both irritating in the eyes of 
Spanish authorities and valuable allies to the British seeking to tap the profitable markets 
of the Spanish Main. 
 The regional autonomy of New Granada contributed to the prevalence of illicit 
activity in the environs of Cartagena. Perhaps no region contributed more to the 
contraband trade in New Granada than the Guajiro Peninsula in the viceroyalty‟s 
northeast. As Grahn describes, “peculiar to Riohacha and its regional informal economy, 
the numerous coves and anchorages of the Guajiro peninsula were controlled by clans of 
unpacified Guajiro Indians who detested most Spaniards but willingly traded with 
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foreigners.”15 The ability for Guajiro Indian groups to maintain their autonomy, in fact, 
depended on their involvement in the contraband trade with non-Iberian powers.  
 Yet, despite repeated efforts by royal authorities in New Granada in 1578, 1616, 
1718, and 1760 to pacify the Guajiros, the entire peninsula tenaciously clung to its 
autonomy – aided, again, to a large extent by their trade relationship with outside 
merchants, especially with the introduction of British weapons. Perhaps the most extreme 
example of the kind of autonomy enjoyed by the Guajiros can be demonstrated by 
examining the ill-fated attempt to pacify the region during the second viceroyalty. In an 
attempt to eliminate the overwhelming influx of contraband into New Granada, Viceroy 
Pedro Messía de la Cerda sent armed soldiers into the region in 1771 in order to 
definitively pacify the Guajiros. In total, Messía sent in a contingent of 1,000 armed 
soldiers. Upon arrival, however, field commander Colonel Benito Encio encountered a 
force of between 7,000 to 10,000 Guajiro Indians. Not only was the Spanish contingent 
numerically overwhelmed but the Guajiros were additionally, “armed with superior 
British guns.”16 In the face of such intimidating resistance, Encio fled the front, claiming 
that the expense and loss of life required to pacify the Guajiros were beyond what the 
viceroyalty was capable of supporting – thereby permitting the continued involvement of 
the Guajiro Peninsular in the contraband trade. Even earlier pushes to pacify the Guajiros 
were likewise thwarted by the superiority of the Indians‟ British weapons. In addition to 
the prevalence of contraband trade, the relationship maintained between the Guajiro 
Indians and British merchants strained an already tense relationship between the Spanish 
and British crowns.  
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  In the years leading up to the War of Jenkins‟ Ear, almost continual conflicts 
erupted between Spanish coastguards and the British merchants of the South Sea 
Company. Several instances regarding conflicts of faith raise interesting questions about 
the role of authorities of the Inquisition in transimperial trade. Although allowed to 
remain Protestant during their tenure in the South Sea Company‟s factories, the presence 
of British Protestants in Spanish America irked religious authorities who began to express 
growing resentment and grievances to the crown regarding their “heretical” neighbors. As 
early as 1716, Inquisition officials rallied against the deleterious effect of Protestants in 
their Catholic realm. In a letter to the King, the Inquisitor of Cartagena, don Thomas 
Gutierrez Escalante, expressed a growing concern that the mere presence of Protestantism 
in Cartagena was undermining the Catholic faith. He argued that the British merchants 
wished to subvert the tenets of the Catholicism in Spanish America and that the King 
should put the interests of the church before economic interests – an aggressive moral 
argument which, largely, fell on deaf ears.
17
  
 For Inquisitor Gutierrez, the presence of a South Sea Company factory in the city 
of Cartagena came with an unreasonable number of Protestants. His complaints to the 
crown illustrate the typical staffing of a factory in the eighteenth century as well as the 
reaction to that factory amongst ecclesiastic authorities in Spanish America. According to 
Gutierrez, the Cartagena factory was dangerously overstaffed and the factors regularly 
mixed with what he saw as his Catholic followers. Through an interrogation of an Irish 
priest, Andres Linje, Gutierrez claimed that the factory housed eleven men – a number in 
excess of the mandated six. In addition, a small population of expatriates had set up shop 
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in Cartagena, including an Englishwoman who owned a bodega in the city and apparently 
kept close ties with the South Sea Company factors. After pressuring the crown to 
remedy the situation, Gutierrez was able to force the principal factor, James Pim, to 
choose six men to remain in the factory and send the rest home. The Englishwoman 
remained in Cartagena, however, claiming to be Catholic – a move which seemed to 
evoke hostility from Gutierrez who, nonetheless, allowed her to remain.
18
  
 International pressure regarding the asiento contract escalated during the 1730s. 
Although the activities of smugglers in undermining licit Spanish-American commerce 
occupy the majority of official complaints against the South Sea Company, ecclesiastic 
authorities documented the daily frictions which abounded between Protestants and 
Catholics – a friction brought to royal attention and only compounding the tensions 
between the two crowns. Throughout the Spanish American port cities that housed 
factories, Inquisition officials sent a flurry of correspondence across the Atlantic 
expressing their extreme distaste for the Anglo-Spanish trade and, at times, winning small 
victories against those factories. British factor John Reis came to the attention of 
Inquisition authorities in Cartagena for allegedly convincing a Catholic woman in 
Havana that Mary did not experience Immaculate Conception but, rather, was physically 
impregnated. By 1733, after examining the case for several years, Inquisitor Don Manuel 
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 While the majority of conflicts cited by ecclesiastic authorities in Spanish 
America revolved around “heretical” behavior on the part of South Sea Company agents, 
the veritable cold war between the Inquisition and the British factors sometimes turned 
hot. As Spain ramped up coastguard patrols throughout Spanish America to police the 
contraband trade, the South Sea Company factory in Veracruz faced a crisis of its own – 
one which threatened the very existence of the factory. On the night of the 25
th
 of July, 
1729, a Dominican priest and a small entourage of residents of Veracruz approached the 
South Sea Company factory to pay the factors there a visit, friendly according to the 
testimony of the Spanish residents involved. According to the Inquisition records, as the 
group approached the factory in the dark, shots were fired and the Dominican priest fell 
dead. The man who fired the fatal shots, William Booth, claimed that he did not 
recognize the priest and fired on the group in self-defense, assuming that they were 
approaching the factory in order to rob it. For his complicity in the murder, Booth was 
sentenced to five years hard labor in North Africa – a veritable death sentence for the 
factor. The incident sparked outrage in the community around Veracruz, and only with 
smooth negotiation by Benjamin Keene, the British Ambassador to Spain, was the factory 
allowed to remain in the city.
20
  
 From the Inquisition‟s records of the event, the behavior of Booth and the other 
factors at Veracruz appears somewhat vicious and completely unreasonable. The 
Dominican priest seems the innocent victim of senseless violence perpetrated by 
“heretical” British merchants. A letter from James Moriarty to Captain John Van Horn in 
March of 1727, however, could possibly cast Booth in a different light. Moriarty wrote to 
Van Horn in order to give him instructions on how to run the Santa Marta factory in his 
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absence. In one section of the extensive instructions, Moriarty tells Van Horn, “You are 
to be vigilant at night that the house be not robbed, there being even attempts of that kind 
already made since I have come into it, which I prevented by rounding the house armed 
at different times of the night.”21 Moriarty‟s letter could explain the events in Veracruz 
on July 25
th
 – especially assuming that Veracruz was also subject to being robbed in the 
same way that Moriarty claims occurred in Santa Marta. The presence of armed men 
surrounding the factories throughout the night at Spanish American factories and the 
eruption of violence in Veracruz hint at the daily tensions between residents of Spanish 
American cities and South Sea Company factories which existed throughout the asiento 
period. 
   While the incident at Veracruz certainly cannot be considered typical, Moriarty‟s 
instructions to arm guards may indicate a more widespread issue of security for South 
Sea Company factors. The prevalence of contraband trade, either conducted by factors 
themselves or blamed on the company, and the issues of religious conflict represent the 
mounting tensions of the late 1720s and early 1730s, tensions which would erupt into 
conflict by the latter end of that period. Despite the economic necessity of the slave trade 
to Spanish America, the diplomats who worked ceaselessly to keep trade running 
smoothly between the two empires, and the clearly delineated rules of the asiento contract 
itself, conflict between the two crowns seemed inevitable. As guardacostas patrolled 
Spanish American waters in increasing numbers, and legitimate asiento vessels were 
taken as prizes, the Caribbean of the mid-eighteenth century was theater to daily 
skirmishes – including one between Master Robert Jenkins and Captain Juan de León 
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Fandiño that would bring the Spanish and British to blows, with drastic consequences for 






THE EAR COMES OFF 
 
 By the middle of the 1730s, the coveted asiento contract that Great Britain had 
won only through their involvement in armed conflict seemed more burdensome than 
profitable. For Spain, the supply of slaves their colonies received from the South Sea 
Company barely made up for the political and economic problems that accompanied the 
trade. Throughout the decade, both sides proposed several methods for the legal cessation 
of the contract even while mounting tensions seemed to make the outbreak of the War of 
Jenkins‟ Ear almost inevitable. As complaints over contraband and heretical activities 
plagued South Sea Company factories, those same merchants leveled diatribes against the 
Spanish coastguard for their aggressions against legal asiento vessels. While the war 
itself has tended to fall into historical obscurity next to more momentous conflicts such as 
the Seven Years‟ War and the American Revolution, the War of Jenkins‟ Ear set 
precedents that would be more fully realized in the latter conflicts of the eighteenth 
century. The loss of Jenkins‟ ear and the declaration of war also sounded the death knell 
for the South Sea Company‟s involvement in trade with Spanish America – opening the 
doors for private traders to inundate Spanish American ports more fully than their 
corporate antecedents. The eruption of full-scale war in the Caribbean as well as the 




 As tensions between South Sea Company factors and Spanish coastguards and 
officials escalated throughout the Spanish American world, Spanish and British 
negotiators struggled ceaselessly to reach a compromise that would allow the asiento 
contract to proceed. Both sides of the negotiating table understood the basic problems 
regarding the trade – rampant abuse of the asiento contract by the South Sea Company, 
the inability of Spanish merchants to meet colonial demands, and officially sanctioned 
harassment of British shipping were at least some of the key issues that Thomas 
Geraldino, the Spanish agent in London, and Benjamin Keene, the British ambassador in 
Madrid, attempted to work through in the middle years of the 1730s. The most pressing 
issues for Keene regarded the aggressive nature of Spanish coastal patrols coupled with 
the large amount of debt owed to the South Sea Company from individual Spanish 
American buyers.  
  The various abuses of the asiento contract which the South Sea Company and 
private British traders engaged in came to the full attention of the crown through the 
complaints of royal officials charged with curbing that contraband. As a means of dealing 
with what seemed like total disregard for trade laws, especially after the disbanding of the 
first viceroyalty, Philip V turned to policing the coast more vigorously. Traditional 
Anglo-Spanish animosities coupled with the permission of the king to engage in 
aggressive raids of ships which possibly contained contraband, however, meant that 
guardacostas made a habit of harassing all ships flying the Union Jack – even when their 
destination was not Spanish held territory. Above all, the presence of Spanish pirates 
engaged in the defense of the coast, a policy which harkens back to the initial years of 




fact, “the presence of outlaws on the high seas and the failure of the Spanish government 
to curb their depredations allowed the company to question whether the Spaniards were 
seriously interested in the fulfillment of the asiento contract.”1 The aggressive nature of 
Spanish vessels in the Caribbean led directly to the aforementioned encounter between 
Master Jenkins and Captain Fandiño, yet theirs is only the most famous of a barrage of 
belligerent sea-raids which Spanish vessels engaged in with the complicity of their 
monarch. 
 For the South Sea Company, and the British Empire as a whole, the asiento 
contract promised access to the profitable and closed markets of Spanish America. As 
discussed previously, the promise of access to those markets came mostly through the 
clause in the contract which allowed for an annual permission ship to attend the trade 
fairs. In reality, however, warfare and Spanish political maneuvering prevented many of 
the planned permission ships from ever reaching Spanish America – much to the 
consternation of South Sea Company officials in London. At times, warfare simply 
prevented the permission ship from crossing the Atlantic while, at other points, Spanish 
officials refused to disclose when the trade fair was taking place until it had already 
passed. Perhaps the most irksome practice, however, occurred when Spanish officials 
prohibited the permission ship from sailing due to the fact that the markets in the 
Americas were already saturated with contraband trade – sometimes carried by the 
Company but often shuttled across the Caribbean by Jamaican interlopers. In fact, during 
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 Despite the fabled wealth of Spanish America, many port cities in which the 
South Sea Company conducted business fell into deep debt to the Company. In the early 
years of the asiento contract, issues arose between the South Sea Company and Jamaican 
planters regarding the purchase of slaves for currency or on credit – with the Company 
preferring to conduct business in Spanish America due to the abundance of specie. By the 
1730s, however, the situation in some parts of Spanish America had drastically changed. 
Exemplary of this, “By 1735 Cartagena debtors alone owed the company 166,000 pesos, 
forcing the South Sea Company to consider relinquishing its trade prerogatives in the 
West Indies well before the War of Jenkins‟ Ear erupted in 1739.”3 Occasionally these 
debtors were slave merchants who bought the slaves on the coast and then peddled the 
human captives throughout the interior or they were also often wealthy individuals who 
bought slaves for their homes or to send out in gangs to pan for gold in the interior 
regions of the Chocó.
4
 Without the promised profits of the annual permission ships, with 
growing debt in Spanish America, and with the aggressive raids of Spanish guardacoastas 
and privateers throughout the Caribbean, the future of the asiento contract seemed 
uncertain at best as Ambassador Keene and the Spanish agent Geraldino approached the 
negotiating table in order to prevent the outbreak of war. 
 For the Spanish representative, the issues regarding the asiento contract revolved 
entirely around the abuses perpetrated by the South Sea Company and its agents – abuses 
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which, if they could be remedied, would provide for the continuance of the contract. The 
Spanish agent in London, Geraldino, proposed two effective solutions to curb some of the 
contraband in which the Company engaged, remembering, of course, that the Company 
received the blame for all British contraband trade conducted along the Spanish Main 
despite the prevalence of private interlopers. While Geraldino recognized that the issues 
regarding contraband in the Caribbean far exceeded his ability to resolve them, he chose 
two specific issues which would curb at least some of that illicit commerce, especially the 
amount carried by the Company. As will be seen, however, the energetic reforms 
proposed by Geraldino were too little, and came too late. 
 The South Sea Company actively engaged in both the smuggling of provisions 
into Spanish American markets and entering harbors under the pretense of the asiento 
contract with a ship loaded with trade goods and only a couple of slaves. In 1733, 
Geraldino aggressively took issue with these two particular abuses, issuing new 
regulations regarding the conduct of trade. He, “ordered in the king‟s name that all 
provisions carried by the slave ships for the use of the slaves should be secured in a 
magazine having three different locks. The keys to two of the locks would be held by two 
different royal officials; the third key would be kept by a company agent.”5 In this way, 
in order for the slaves‟ provisions to be sold into the contraband marketplace, the 
complicity of all three key holders would be required. Geraldino also mandated that no 
asiento ships be allowed in Spanish American ports unless they contained a complete 
load of slaves which he defined as “a ratio of four slaves to every five tons of a ship‟s 
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burden; thus a ship weighing one hundred tons was supposed to carry eighty slaves.”6 
The outbreak of war, however, prevented Geraldino from determining the efficacy of his 
reforms, while escalating tensions may have prevented their very implementation. 
 While the removal of Master Jenkins‟ ear in 1731 sparked outrage in Great 
Britain and pity amongst the Parliament members who witnessed his testimony, it would 
take years of merchant agitation against Spanish naval aggressions to tip the scales to 
war. While the British Prime Minister, Robert Walpole, argued vociferously for the 
maintenance of peace, the merchant lobby, whose losses in the Caribbean augmented 
daily, continually pushed for war in order to redress their grievances.
7
 Despite the 
agitation of the merchant community, Walpole was able to organize a last ditch effort to 
maintain peace through a series of hasty negotiations. However, in July 1739, the 
negotiations were broken off and George II declared war on October 19.
8
 The War of 
Jenkins‟ Ear merged into the larger War of Austrian Succession and raged for nearly a 
decade before a shaky treaty would be signed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. One particular 
incident during the conflict, however, encapsulates the legacy of commercial relations 
between Jamaica and Cartagena throughout the eighteenth century and serves as an 
appropriate conclusion for this study – that being, the invasion of Cartagena. 
 While the purpose of the first Viceroyalty of New Granada centered on curbing 
the depredations of foreign merchants, the second resurgence of that viceroyalty revolved 
around providing defense for the Spanish Main‟s most important port city – Cartagena. 
The looming conflict with Great Britain along with the vulnerability of the Spanish Main 
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to assault led to the proposed recreation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada.
9
 This time, 
however, the post of Viceroy would be assigned to a young graduate from the Academia 
Militar de Matématicas in Barcelona, Sebastián de Eslava, who, upon his arrival, 
immediately set about preparing the city for its defense. Eslava would be aided, and at 
times come into conflict with, Spain‟s most celebrated naval veteran, Blas de Lezo. The 
combined skill of both men coupled with Cartagena‟s easily defensible harbor would be 
needed in order to counter the threat looming across the Caribbean. 
 British strategy in the Caribbean during the initial years of the War of Jenkins‟ 
Ear did, in fact, center on placing the well-fortified Cartagena under siege. In order to 
guarantee success in the operation and strike what was perceived as a fatal blow to 
Spanish America, Admiral Edward Vernon amassed the largest amphibious force to date 
to assault the city. In fact, according to Grahn, “Vernon struck at Cartagena with 21 
warships, 170 transports, and 23,000 men. Blas de Lezo and Sebastián Eslava, who 
jointly directed the defense of the city, had only 18 vessels at most and just 3,000 troops 
with which to counter the invasion force.”10 As a precedent for the involvement of the 
North American continent in later eighteenth-century wars, Vernon also counted 3,600 
North American soldiers from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, 




 Despite Vernon‟s numerical superiority – with superiority being understood as an 
understatement – the disease environment of the Caribbean took an immediate toll. The 
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troops and the fleet arranged to rendezvous on the island of Jamaica before proceeding on 
to the assault of Cartagena. For many of the troops, however, their hiatus in Jamaica 
proved disastrous and many succumbed to fever or sickened themselves on the island‟s 
plentiful supply of rum.
12
 The disease environment of tropical Cartagena was no 
improvement to that of Jamaica, between disease and mismanagement of such a large 
force on the part of Vernon and Brigadier General Thomas Wentworth, the British force 
was repulsed by a much smaller Spanish defense. Perhaps the most notable casualty on 
the side of the Spanish was the lamentable loss of Lezo, who died of wounds received 
during the siege.  
 An emphasis on metropolitan concerns regarding the tactical maneuvering of 
Vernon or the defensive capabilities of Lezo, however, ignores a more intriguing question 
about the role of contraband trade during the conflict. Despite the fact that it was the 
transatlantic pressures regarding contraband trade that led directly to the War of Jenkins‟ 
Ear, the trade networks established throughout the early decades of the eighteenth century 
would maintain their prominence during the war years. As Lezo built up defenses around 
Cartagena, he also purchased vast amounts of foodstuffs and supplies from Jamaican 
merchants in order to prepare for the imminent siege building up on that same island. In 
fact, “Ironically, it was an English frigate loaded with flour for the Cartagena squadron 
that brought the first news to the port of the king‟s intended declaration of war and of the 
buildup of the Jamaican fleet.”13 The pressure of increased numbers of defenders in 
Cartagena, coupled with a complete lack of domestic sources, required officials to seek 
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supplies of foodstuffs from the very island where the British invaders were busy 
sickening themselves on Jamaica‟s rum supply.  
 Throughout the eighteenth century, Cartagena depended on the introduction of 
comestibles and basic trade goods from their British counterparts in the Caribbean, with 
the period of the War of Jenkins‟ Ear being no exception. As imperial negotiators, 
military planners, and royal advisors devised, schemed, and argued about an appropriate 
policy to end the illegal activity prevalent between Spanish and British subjects in the 
Americas, residents of Jamaica and Cartagena adopted the only workable solution – 
trade. Lezo‟s fleet of eighteen ships defending the port received their naval stores from 
Jamaican interlopers, the soldiers stationed in forts all along the Spanish Main fed on 
flour imported by Jamaicans, and the terrified residents of Cartagena waited for the siege 
to end dressed in Brittany linens. The various accusations of corruption, invectives about 
abuses of the asiento contract, or appeals made for more supplies made little difference 
on the ground as the subjects of disparate empires developed their own means of survival 
and economic success. 
    The War of Jenkins‟ Ear brought to a close the South Sea Company‟s 
involvement in the asiento contract. The Company never recovered its economic 
preeminence and its collapse would bring about an economic and political scandal which 
reverberated throughout Britain for the next decade. The demise of the South Sea 
Company also marked the end of a distinct era of economic policy in transatlantic trade. 
By the conclusion of the war, “The chartered company was fast becoming a commercial 
anachronism; the age of the energetic private trader was at hand.”14 Private traders, 
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including those of Jamaica who had caused so many problems for the South Sea 
Company, would continue both the African slave trade to Spanish America as well as the 
illicit inter-American trade to Cartagena. In fact, the commercial relationship between 
Jamaica and Cartagena continued in the decades after the War of Jenkins‟ Ear, slowing 
only at the conclusion of the eighteenth century as the American Revolution cut Jamaica 
off from its former supply of comestibles and as the island‟s sugar economy in the wake 







 While this study explores the relationship between imperial expectations and 
colonial realities through the lens of contraband trade in the Caribbean, it is by no means 
comprehensive in its coverage. There are glaring gaps in the scholarship which have 
hampered my attempts to elucidate the multitudinous nuances of the interimperial 
economic connections in the Americas. Constraints on both time and resources can also 
account for some of the places in this study where more work remains to be done. 
Primarily, the role of Spanish merchants in the Americas is almost entirely absent from 
the present study – their absence here is obviously not an indication of their absence in 
either Spanish America or the Iberian Peninsula. The role of Spanish merchants in 
purchasing illicit goods and redistributing them throughout Cartagena and its hinterlands 
would provide a more nuanced understanding of how the contraband trade functioned 
once it left the docks – a subject which, again, is sorely missing from the present work. 
 In much the same way, the sources of contraband goods from within the British 
Empire are shrouded in obscurity in the present study. While allusions are made to the 
sources of supply with words like Brittany linen and Pennsylvania flour, I have provided 
few definitive commercial connections across the broader Atlantic world. Such 
connections, besides demonstrating a sort of international marketplace,
1
 would serve to 
deepen our understanding of imperial complicity in the contraband trade. Did Brittany 
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linen merchants know the destination of their shipments or was such commercial 
planning solely the responsibility of Jamaican interlopers? If they did know that their 
products were destined for Spanish American consumers, did that knowledge alter what 
they sent? How strong was the understanding of consumer taste in Spanish America 
amongst British merchants? These questions, while not broached in the present study, are 
fundamental to understanding the broader, interimperial marketplace which I have only 
dimly alluded to in the previous pages.  
 For the most part, this work relies heavily on the work of historians such as Lance 
Grahn and Colin Palmer, while simultaneously challenging their adherence to the 
boundaries of nation-states. Both historians‟ books speak to the same events and regions 
and, yet, relate remarkably different narratives. A fundamental challenge for this work 
has been to bring together these vastly different narratives without relying on traditional 
stereotypes repeated there. For that reason, analyzing primary sources from both empires 
has greatly aided this work in attempting to bridge that historiographic gap. While this 
work is deeply indebted to the aforementioned scholars as well as a plethora of other 
works cited here, it has also, hopefully, contributed to the wider historical conversation 
about this period. Specifically, I have sought to add to the growing number of scholars 
who are taking seriously the Americas as a hemispheric whole with a history which can 
and should be discussed together – historians such as J.H. Elliot, Felipe Fernández-
Armesto, Eric Hinderaker, and Rebecca Horn to name a few. It is to the latter two to 
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